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Abstract 
 
In this study, I review the trajectory of the methodology in the resurrection debate in South 
African New Testament scholarship. I critique the traditional/confessional and historical-
critical methodologies to expose inherent flaws within them. I then propose that the only type 
of historiography that considers the fundamental cultural differences between the western 21st 
century and ancient Mediterranean where the resurrection visions are concerned is the social-
scientific historiography. Notwithstanding the value of social-scientific methodology in 
general, I contend that there are at least two orientations within the social-scientific 
methodology one of which is crucial to the understanding of resurrection visions. My 
conclusion is that the social-scientific version which utilizes fieldwork in general and 
participant observation in particular as envisioned by John Pilch is the most useful tool in 
understanding post resurrection visions. 
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Chapter 1 
Research Premise 
1.1 Introduction 
New Testament Scholars from all over the academic world and from varied methodological 
frameworks have written extensively on the resurrection of Jesus for close to two centuries. 
Secondary literature on New Testament resurrection narratives is so vast that some scholars 
have asked the question, what is left to say?  (Craffert 2009 & Schutte 2008). While the 
question of the plausibility of resurrection has dominated historical Jesus research for a long 
time, a succession of different biblical interpretive methods has not helped to resolve this 
question. In recent times, claims of resurrection in some Pentecostal/Charismatic 
Johannesburg parishes have dominated the South African media. The question insistently 
arising is whether such claims as resurrection are truthful, or these are just cleverly concocted 
lies to deceive the gullible. More so as some of the more prominent leaders in 
Charismatic/Pentecostal Christianity have been investigated for fraud and money laundering. 
The question whether a position can be reached on the veridicality of the resurrection of Jesus 
remains unanswered.  This study is mainly seized with the following questions: What are 
South African New Testament Scholars contributing to the resurrection debate? Can the 
resurrection discourses in South Africa be enriched by insights from Social-Scientific 
Historiography? In addition, what would be novel about this study that social-scientific 
methodology in general has not already articulated given that the social-scientific interpretive 
method has been around for almost four decades?   
The debate on the resurrection of Jesus was stimulated by the change of paradigm followed 
by the 18th century’s intellectual movement (Enlightenment). During this time, human reason 
was held to be the ultimate norm for truth. Soon the Bible was also critically read and 
interpreted as the result of the emergence of the historical-critical approach that questioned 
the historicity of certain events recorded in the Gospels, especially the resurrection of Jesus 
of Nazareth. This was also done in the light of comparative religious studies that compared 
the Gospel accounts of Jesus with Greco-Roman narratives of other redemptive figures (Harris 
& Platzner 2004: 112).  
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Chapter one deals with a general overview of the resurrection debate. Terms will be defined, 
and the scope of the study will also be delineated.  The focus will be on how and when the 
Historical Jesus research came to South Africa. I also deal with the methodology of the study, 
rationale and the limitations of the study. Chapter 2 deals with the trajectory of conceptual 
and theoretical frameworks. Chapter 3 focusses mainly on the historical-critical methodology 
as the dominant methodology in historical Jesus debate. It also enumerates and summarises 
the various positions of South African scholars viz a vis their counterparts across the academic 
world. Chapter 4 zeroes in on socio-scientific historiography and its evaluation of the veracity 
of Jesus’ resurrection. Chapter 5 is a synthesis, summary and a consideration of the study’s 
practical applications and an analysis of the future of resurrection research.   
1.1.2 The Resurrection of Jesus Debate: A Brief Introduction 
The background of the Christian understanding of the resurrection concept is grounded in the 
Jewish martyr’s tradition, which is at its most conspicuous during the Intertestamental Period 
(500 BCE-200 CE, cf. Den Heyer 1983:19-20; 1997). The debate about the resurrection of Jesus 
and how it should be interpreted had already been introduced in New-Zealand by the 1960s 
by Prof Lloyd but it was only recently that the resurrection debate was the topic of scholarly 
and ecclesiastical conferences and seminars in South Africa, e.g., Annual Congress of the New 
Testament Society of South Africa (NTSSA) 19-22 April 2010 University of Kwazulu-Natal; 
NTSSA NWU Potchefstroom; 11 May 2010 at the University of Johannesburg; 12 May 2010 at 
University of Pretoria, The New Testament Society of Southern Africa, University of South 
Africa, Pretoria, 10-13 September 2013. 
1.2 What is Resurrection? 
 A good definition of the concept ‘resurrection’ must of necessity come from within the 
context of first-century Christianity. Otherwise, any other definition outside the first century 
context would be both ethnocentric and anachronistic. In a bid to contextualize resurrection, 
Crossan asks, “When Christian Jews spoke of Jesus’ resurrection, what did they mean to 
announce and what would others whether believers or not have understood them to claim?" 
(Crossan 2003: 46). Bearing in mind the biblical context of resurrection, scholars are 
unanimous in defining ‘resurrection’ as the raising of a person from the dead to post-mortem 
eternal existence. Charlesworth in particular, argues that, “resurrection denotes the concept 
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of God’s raising the body and soul after death (meant literally) to a new and eternal life (not 
a return to mortal existence).” As such, Charlesworth continues, “[t]his belief should not be 
confused with the Hellenistic concept of the immortality of the soul ...” (Charlesworth 2006: 
2). In addition, De Wet approaches Chrysostom’s exegesis of the resurrection from a historical 
point of view. He notes that for Chrysostom, resurrection is carnis resurrection (De Wet 2011: 
92). The observation that resurrection is ‘bodily’ resurrection will become relevant in the 
course of the study.  
 A careful study of secondary literature on resurrection narratives yields the idea that there 
are three main orientations within resurrection studies.  Many scholars down the years have 
proposed that the resurrection was something that happened to the disciples rather than to 
Jesus himself. One of the most popular of such theories is the hallucination hypothesis (Smith 
2019:54). This theory is known as the illusory view.  Additionally, orthodox New Testament 
scholars emphasize that Jesus was literally, bodily and physically raised from the dead, and 
therefore they analyse and read the Gospel texts to verify that there is enough historical 
reason to accept the historicity of the resurrection events (Wright 2003: 686-706, Craig 1981: 
23-24). This view can be described as the literalistic view.  
Craffert, a prominent proponent of social-scientific criticism at the University of South Africa 
adds another group to these two, namely the symbolic category (Craffert 2008:50). Those 
who view resurrection as a symbolic act for the most part embrace philosophical naturalism 
(Craffert 2008: 49). Philosophical naturalism argues that incredible events cannot be historical 
(Craffert 2008: 49). Accordingly, an event such as bodily resurrection can only be understood 
symbolically. Should there be a choice therefore, between a literalistic or illusory or even 
symbolic view of the understanding of the resurrection of Jesus? Rather, can the 
acknowledgement of the existence of multiple cultural realities with divergent rationalities 
be an alternative to these polarizing views? Can anything new be said about our 
understanding of the resurrection accounts reflected in the Gospels and about the scholarly 
debates and in what way perceptions of the resurrection influence the relationship between 
the academic community and the belief communities in South Africa?   Resurrection debates 
in South Africa cannot however be closed off from those taking place across the academic 
world.  As such, local scholars will be brought into dialogue with related discourses across the 
academic world. 
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1.3 What Resurrection is Not 
Crossan puts ‘resurrection’ in contradistinction to other after-life notions which obtained in 
ancient Mediterranean. For Crossan, resurrection is not simply revivification. Those who 
spoke of Jesus’ resurrection insisted that it was after three days or on the third day. In Jewish 
tradition it was customary to visit the tomb on the third day to make sure the person was 
certainly dead (Crossan 2003: 46). That is why Jesus waited until “Lazarus had already been 
in the tomb four days, that is until he was securely and definitely dead” (John 11:17, Crossan 
2003: 46). Therefore, when the first Christian believers spoke of Jesus’ resurrection after or 
on the third day, they were convinced that he had been really and truly dead (Crossan 2003: 
46). What however is different between the raising to life of Jesus and that of Lazarus, and 
what Crossan does not draw attention to, is that whereas Lazarus later dies for good, Jesus is 
said to have been raised to post-mortem eternal existence. 
Moreover, Crossan argues that resurrection is not bodily resuscitation. By this, he is referring 
to “people who are saved from death at the last instance or who are revived even after their 
hearts have temporarily stopped or who have come back from death-like comma” (Crossan 
2003: 46). Again, Crossan asserts that resurrection is not heavenly exaltation. There is 
evidence that a very holy person in Jewish tradition could be taken up to heaven by God. In 
this way a holy person could escape death, decay and enter even before anyone ever spoke 
of bodily resurrection or spiritual immortality (Crossan 2003: 47). Two examples are 
applicable in this regard. “Thus, Enoch walked with God then he was no more because God 
took him” (Gen 5:24, Heb 11:5). “Similarly, as Elijah and Elisha walked and talked near the 
Jordan, a chariot of fire and horses separated the two of them and Elijah ascended in a 
whirlwind into heaven” (2 Kngs 2:11).  For Crossan that “is exaltation, assumption, ascension 
or apotheosis, but it is not resurrection” (Crossan 2003: 47).   
Crossan also maintains that “altered states of consciousness are not indications of 
resurrection (Crossan 2003: 47). Altered States of Consciousness will be discussed in full in 
chapter 4, suffice it to say here that these are trances or states in which someone seems to 
enter into another world, an immaterial world of gods and disembodied beings. This is where 
Crossan parts ways with social-scientific critics influenced by a postmodern paradigm. Social-
Scientific interpreters claim that it is in alternate reality in which Jesus is apprehended in his 
resurrected state by the first witnesses.  
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1.4 Resurrection as General Resurrection 
Crossan is of the opinion that within first century Jewish culture, to speak of Jesus’ 
resurrection claimed that the general resurrection had begun (2003: 49). This understanding 
of the resurrection echoes features of Paul’s argumentation in 1 Cor 15. On the one hand, 
Paul speaks of Jesus’ resurrection as “the first fruits of those who have died” (1 Cor 15: 20), 
interpreting Jesus’ resurrection as the start of the general resurrection as a harvest.  “Paul 
repeatedly and logically argues in both directions from Jesus’ resurrection to general 
resurrection and from the general resurrection to Jesus’ resurrection” (Crossan 2003: 49). 
Those two events stand or fall together as start and end of a single process. Therefore, in light 
of this, the resurrection is indicating that God’s new creation, God’s justified world was 
already present: resurrection to ordinary minded and pious pagans meant that God had 
already begun a process of justification and vindication (Crossan 2003: 49).  
1.5 Reading the New Testament: Problems Encountered 
 Malina argues that, “[a]ny historically sensitive reading of New Testament writings 
necessarily puts the reader in the role of a stranger in that extremely strange and curious land 
of the first century” (Malina 1996:4). In addition, the fact that the Bible was originally written 
in foreign and ancient languages makes it even stranger to the average 21st century reader of 
the Bible (Malina 1996: 4).  
1.6 Research Methodology 
The Social-scientific approach will be applied to reconstruct the socio-cultural worlds that may 
have generated the concept of resurrection. The socio-scientific approach emphasises the 
relationship between the texts of the Bible and the life lived by the early Christian 
communities. A socio-scientific reading is that phase of the exegetical task which concerns 
itself with the social and cultural dimensions of the text and of its environmental context. 
Thus, socio-scientific criticism aims at acquiring the meanings shaped by the social and 
cultural systems inhabited by both the authors and the intended readerships or audiences. 
Social scientific scholars wish to interpret the biblical texts within the context of the social and 
cultural world of the ancient Mediterranean society. The social and cultural world of the 
ancient Mediterranean society is recreated by aid of comparative contemporary primitive 
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societies. Here ‘primitive’ is not used in the pejorative way but as a way of describing societies 
which share the same beliefs as the first century Christian. For want of a better term, 
‘primitive’ will be used. 
There are three implications of the social-scientific study to the current debate: 
1. The on-going dispute in the historical Jesus research as to whether the resurrection 
accounts should be taken literally (Wright 2006) or metaphorically (Crossan 2006), or 
as an illusion (Smith 2019) or should be abandoned and an alternative view formulated 
(Craffert 2009:148, Pilch 2004) will come to the fore. 
2. A social-scientific approach places worldview back in the centre of historical 
interpretation. That implies that historical investigation does not take place in the 
absence of worldview, but in terms of worldview. Therefore, a culturally sensitive 
reading of New Testament accounts suggests that visionary encounters were for the 
ancient reader adequate and enough for claiming Jesus’ resurrection from the dead, 
and such claims can only be made in view of multiple cultural realities (Craffert 2009: 
150) 
3. A social-scientific reading is a culturally sensitive reading of the Gospel accounts that 
parallel ethnocentric and anachronistic readings of modern scholarship, and it offers 
an alternative interpretation of the same accounts (Craffert 2009: 150). 
To obtain the above research aims, selected South African literature is critically evaluated 
against other literature throughout the academic world. The literature from the demarcated 
field of study will be selected and retrieved from academic books, journal articles and 
academic researches, theses and websites. A conceptual analysis will form part of the 
discussion. 
1.7 Rationale for the Study 
The importance of the concept resurrection and, more specifically, the resurrection of Jesus 
is determined by its central position in Christian belief, theology and praxis. Without the 
resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, the Christian faith would lose its essence. Wedderburn 
formulates it as follows: “A Christian faith that is not resurrection faith can be called neither 
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Christian nor faith” (Wedderburn 1991: 1). “Within first-century Jewish culture, to speak of 
Jesus’ resurrection claimed that the general resurrection had begun” (Crossan 2003: 20 cf. 1 
Cor 15:20). Paul is clear when he opines that the very Christian faith hinges on the resurrection 
of Jesus: “Then if Christ be not raised, then is our preaching in vain, and your faith in vain” (1 
Cor 15:14). According to Crossan, “ordinary people familiar with Old Testament thought could 
understand that the death on the cross had introduced the day of the Lord with all its aspects 
negative and positive, with the latter including conquest of death and resurrection to eternal 
life” (Crossan 2003: 52). The resurrection of Jesus in this regard would be a demonstration of 
power over that old enemy ‘death’. Matthew’s account shows imaginatively how Jesus’ 
resurrection broke the power of death (Matt 27: 51b-53).   
Furthermore, “if the assertion that God had begun the general resurrection with Jesus, was a 
first stunningly original step in earliest Christian Judaism, the assertion that God expected 
active participation in Gentile conversion was the second equally stunning one” (Crossan 
2003: 52). In other words, the fact of Jesus resurrection if indeed it can be considered a fact, 
demands a response, it demands action (Brown 1994: 1137). It places a responsibility on 
anyone who ‘believes’ to take up the work of a proselytizer. Jesus rose alone but soon all 
Christians will join him in resurrection (1 Thess 14:14-17). A corporate and not just a personal 
resurrection would be presumed as the start of the general resurrection which was about the 
justice of God (Crossan 2003: 53).  Licona, believes that if it could be proved that Jesus was 
not raised from the dead then he would renounce his faith and would have to step down from 
his clerical positions: “For me, if the resurrection of Jesus were ever disproved, I would feel 
compelled to abandon my Christian faith...” (Licona 2010: 130). Licona continues: “I am aware 
that should my research lead me to the conclusion that Jesus did not rise from the dead I 
would be dismissed from my position and my employment would be terminated” (Licona 
2010: 132). A corollary to this is a question of whether an atheist would become Christian if 
it were proved that indeed Jesus of Nazareth was raised from the dead. Therefore, the reality 
or otherwise of the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth have implications whether one proceeds 
from a theistic or an atheistic worldview.    
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1.8 Limitations of the Study 
This study is unable to exhaust all the literature and personalities involved due to the sheer 
vastness of the subject. Be that as it maybe, the above approach will suffice to track the 
‘important options that have shaped research and debate’ in the resurrection studies (Le 
Beau, Greenspoon, Hamm 2000: 1). 
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Chapter 2 
Research Framework and Presuppositions 
2.1 The Traditional/Confessional Perspective 
The first interpretive method of biblical studies to come to the fore is the 
traditional/confessional interpretive method. Hennie Viviers, professor of Religion Studies at 
the University of Johannesburg hinges the traditional/confessional interpretive perspective 
on the work of Josephus the Jewish historian (Viviers 2005: 107-108). It was at the turn of the 
first century CE that the Jewish historian Josephus emphasized the reliability of the Jewish 
canon, Moses’ authorship of the first five books (Pentateuch) that the prophetic books had 
been finalized in the fifth century BCE (Viviers 2005: 107). Josephus (37-93 CE) had described 
the Jewish canon as the product of inspired authors and literature of a sacred nature of which 
the wording was inviolable. In this way Josephus accurately articulated the traditional view of 
canon formation, the echoes of which maybe clearly heard even today (Viviers 2005: 107). A 
canon is a collection of the 66 Christian books in the Bible which was adjudicated as having 
been truly inspired (Moller 1998: 45). The traditional view of the growth of the canon 
presupposes an unbroken continuity between the original ‘putting into words’ by the authors 
and the ultimate compiling into an authoritative collection of texts by Ezra and members of 
the Great Synagogue. 
 In terms of this view, the authenticity of the canon is guaranteed by the status of the writers 
of the books. In addition, the truth of the canon is guaranteed by the doctrine of divine 
inspiration while the purity of the canon is guaranteed by the unbroken continuity between 
the writing down and the putting together of the books (Viviers 2005: 108). The assumption 
was that the reliability of scripture was more effective if it could be traced back to single 
names of inspired authors. This approach in a simplistic way satisfied the church and its 
confessions (Du Rand 2005: 160). The faith affirmation that the Bible is inspired also affirms 
the divine influence on the author, the reader and the reading of the Bible (cf 1 Cor 2:14, Du 
Rand 2005: 156).  
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Perhaps the modern equivalent of the confessional/traditional method among South African 
mainline churches is the doctrine of inerrancy of scriptures. This view posits that since the 
Bible was an inspired book it could not have any errors.  However, such a doctrine is clearly 
untenable given the apparent internal inconsistencies in the Bible. Other orthodox scholars 
have resorted to calling the Bible both a human and a divine book, drawing attention to the 
fact that the perfect word of God came through imperfect humanity and hence occasional 
errors (Moller 1998: 63). 
2.2 The Enlightenment Period and the Historical Jesus Studies 
Developments triggered by the advent of the enlightenment engendered a change in the 
direction of biblical interpretation. Since the 19th century CE, scholars began to question the 
traditional view on canon formation severely. The presupposition about inspiration, 
authorship and the continuity between recording and collection of biblical material became 
virtually untenable when it was discovered that the Old Testament literature was the product 
of a complicated historical process of growth- and not only from the pens of the authors 
traditionally linked to the various books of the Bible (Viviers 2005: 88). It was also found that 
the ‘Great Synagogue’ had not in fact been responsible for the completion of the canon as 
previously believed (Viviers 2005: 88) Instead, it had become apparent that this process had 
only been finalised in the Christian era (circa 90 CE). 
 Furthermore, it became clear that the traditional view was to a certain extend based upon 
historical errors. The traditional view also failed to explain the rise of the different canons. 
When it became clear that the books of the Bible were not necessarily written by the assumed 
authors this tended to diminish the integrity of the Bible especially the New Testament (Dunn 
1985:8-18). The realization that the Gospel accounts themselves not only differed from each 
other but sometimes even contradicted each other compounded the problem. Another 
concern came from the parallel Gospels also popularly known as the Synoptic Gospels 
because they can be ‘seen together’. What could be discerned from the synoptic Gospels is 
that there were different combinations of the same material, different lengths of the same 
material and different emphases of the same material in the three Gospels. There were also 
instances where one Gospel seemed to be correcting another (Dunn 1985: 8-18).  
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 Not surprisingly, attempts were made to harmonize the Gospels. The productions of 
harmonies began in the middle of the second century CE and the most influential harmony of 
the Gospels was compiled by Tatian about 175 CE (Charlesworth 2008:1 see also Crossan 
1991: xxx).  Another concern among scholars in the beginning of the Quest for the Historical 
Jesus was that we do not have any original copy of any of the New Testament documents. 
Although all the New Testament books were probably written by the end of the first century, 
the earliest surviving fragments of a manuscript date around the beginning of the second 
century. The later copies available are probably several stages removed from the original 
autographs. All copying was done by hand which led to all kinds of alterations and mistakes 
being introduced into the texts by scribes. While some alterations were inadvertent others 
were deliberately done to suit certain theological and/or Christological purposes (Viviers 
2005: 88). However, notwithstanding these efforts at harmonizing the different Gospels, it 
was soon realized that these differences could simply not be peppered over. 
 It was then that the focus shifted to the actual sources that the Gospel writers could have 
used (Viviers 2005:88). Dunn points out that the evangelists were not simply recorders of 
tradition. They were also editors. They worked upon and interpreted the traditions they used 
(Dunn 1985:8).  While Jesus preached and taught in Aramaic, the Gospels were all written in 
Greek, the lingua franca of first-century Palestine. The point of this observation is that all 
translation involves some degree of interpretation and it is often the case that there is no 
precise equivalent in the other language and so choices must be made among several words. 
Even more difficult is the rendering of idioms from one language into the different idioms of 
another (Dunn 1985: 3).   
The subjection of the Bible to intense scrutiny then spurned what has become known as the 
historical-critical methods of Bible interpretation but with an initial focus on the sources. 
Thereafter, a host of other interpretive methods began to emerge. Du Rand goes into detail 
in showing the progression of methods from traditional/confessional readings of scriptures 
to methods such as literary criticism, structuralist criticism, rhetorical criticism, source 
criticism, the social scientific criticism and others (Du Rand 2005: 148-228).  
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2.3 Source Criticism 
Dunn (2005: 88) says that “for the first phase or two phases of the quest the focus was on 
sources”. The ‘quest’ here refers to the endeavour by biblical scholars to reconstruct the 
historical life and the ministry of Jesus of Nazareth during the Enlightenment period.  The 
methodological assumption was that the source of a writer’s portrayal of a historical figure 
would provide more valuable historical information than the writer who used the source 
(Dunn 2005:88). The inference was that the source would show whether a subsequent writer 
had been faithful to his source, had made only a tendentious use of it or had improperly 
embellished it (Dunn 2005: 88). In the case of the quest of the historical Jesus, the solution 
reached by the end of the 19th century was known as the two-source hypothesis. The 
conclusion reached from the study of the synoptic Gospels was that the synoptic Gospels 
were interdependent at the literary level. It was also concluded that Mark was the earliest of 
the three and that Matthew and Luke had used both Mark and another source consisting of 
sayings of Jesus conveniently known as Logia-sayings or Q which is German ‘Quelle’ for source 
(Dunn 2005: 88). Consequently, the tendency at the end of the 19th century was to assume 
that Mark as the earliest Gospel was the most reliable historically. However, the 20th century 
was characterized by the conviction that all the Gospels, Mark included could not properly be 
regarded as straightforward history. It was argued that this was because they gave too much 
evidence of the subsequent faith of the first and second generations of Christians (Dunn 
2005:88). “The result was a reassessment of methodological tools. To identify the earliest 
written sources was no longer enough. It became necessary to press behind the earliest 
sources to the still earlier traditions. The quest for the right methods to penetrate back behind 
the Gospels became the necessary preliminary to the quest proper” (Dunn 2005: 87). It was 
then that the focus shifted to forms of literature. 
2.4 Form Criticism 
Form criticism was the answer to the failure or inadequacy of source criticism as a way of 
penetrating behind the written Gospels (Dunn 2005: 88). KL Schmidt had pointed the way 
forward by observing that Mark’s narrative consisted of units that could be distinguished from 
his editorial framework. The form critics proceeded to scrutinize the synoptic tradition and to 
classify all such units: Individual sayings and parables of Jesus, episodes from Jesus’ ministry 
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that regularly climaxed in a profound dictum and stories of Jesus’ doings particularly miracles 
and exorcisms. According to Dunn these were identifiable and consistent forms (Dunn 1985: 
88). Form criticism itself soon came to be more valuable in providing evidence of how the 
forms of the traditions about Jesus were used and manipulated. In the period following 
Bultmann, “the quest of the historical Jesus was revived by pursuing the possibility of using 
form criticism as a positive tool in sifting the Gospel traditions for evidence of what is best 
explained as going back to Jesus himself” (Dunn 2005: 83ff). 
 The methodological quest was now redefined as the quest for criteria, criteria by which it 
could be determined what within the Jesus tradition could be attributed with confidence to 
Jesus himself. John Meier’s discussion well represents the sort of broad consensus that had 
been reached on the subject by the 1990s; both the strengths and the weaknesses of the 
various criteria were proposed. One of the most positive contributions using the form-critical 
method was Heinz Schurmann’s investigation of the pre-Easter beginnings of the Logia 
tradition, which demonstrates how much of the actual content of the material gives no sign 
of having been reworked or created in the post-Easter setting (Dunn 2005: 88). 
As briefly discussed above, the Gospels were not straight forward historical documents 
informing the believers/Church of the exact content of Jesus’ words and deeds. They used 
several sources to interpret the person and ministry of Jesus for a specific audience and 
context. While these debates continued to rage on, it also began to occur to scholars that the 
story of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus was not a unique story but had parallels in 
the lives of classical heroes. 
2.5 Resurrection and Classical Civilizations 
An interesting aspect of the life of Jesus that stood out to scholars was its mimesis of the lives 
of classical heroes. The impression obtained from reading the New Testament was that some 
of the material presented in the New Testament as historical seemed to be inspired by myths 
of classical culture. In the Greek view, “the mythic past was indistinguishable from the 
historical past” (Harris & Platzner 2004: 22). Gods also took human lovers: mating with mortal 
women, Zeus sired many of the greatest heroes and heroines, including Perseus, Heracles and 
Helen. The incomparable strength and beauty of the children thus produced was a proof of 
their divine parentage (Harris & Platzner 2004: 22-23). This was seen to mirror the ‘birth’ of 
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Jesus as issuing from both human and divine parents. Matthew’s rendition of the birth of 
Jesus is one of the clearest examples. “This is how the birth of Jesus came about: His mother 
Mary was pledged in marriage to Joseph, but before they came together, she was found to 
be with child through the Holy Spirit” (Matt 1:18).  The similarity of the stories of Jesus and 
myths in classical culture do not end here. Jesus is said to have suffered some kind of 
paragmos just like characters in classical myths. In words generally believed to be predictive 
of the passion of the Christ, deutero-Isaiah says the following: “But he was pierced for our 
transgressions, He was crushed for our iniquities, the punishment that brought us peace was 
upon him, and by his stripes we are healed” (Isa 53:1-5). Paragmos was a tearing of one’s 
flesh done in an act of sacrifice. The theme of primordial sacrifice, often taking the form of 
sparagmos-the ritual tearing of a sacrificial victim, divine or human- plays a significant role in 
Greek myth, not only in Hesiod’s Theogony but also in narratives about Dionysus and mortal 
heroes (Harris & Platzner 2004: 79). Furthermore, Justin Martyr is quoted as saying,  
And when we say also that the word, who is the first-born of God was produced without 
sexual union and that he, Jesus Christ our Teacher was crucified and died and rose again 
and ascended into Heaven we propound nothing different from what you believe 
regarding those whom you esteem sons of Jupiter (Justin Martyr in Crossan 2003: 54). 
 Dennis R MacDonald elaborates this discussion by arguing that the story about the death and 
resurrection of Jesus was influenced by the story of a Greek legendary hero Hector. 
MacDonald lists comparisons between the heroic death of Jesus and that of Hector for 
example that Hector found himself alone with his enemy Achilles, outside the gates of Troy, 
which is similar to Jesus being abandoned by his disciples (MacDonald 2000: 190). The self-
giving Jesus accepted death at Gethsemane, he did not resist death, he made no defence, and 
he even refused mildly anaesthetic drink. On the cross Jesus gave himself up (MacDonald 
2000: 190). MacDonald sees Jesus’ story as a mimesis of the story of Hector (MacDonald 2000: 
190).  
Furthermore, Plato’s most detailed vision of the soul’s fate after death is contained in the 
‘Myth of Er’, an extended parable of eschatological justice (Harris & Platzner 2004: 300). 
Plato’s myth draws heavily on Orphic doctrines involving purification and regeneration. Er, 
who narrates the tale is a soldier seemingly killed in battle and for ten days lies in a comatose 
state. During this time, his soul leaves his body and journeys to a spiritual realm where the 
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recently dead gather for judgement.  After spending their allotted time either in heaven or a 
place of torment, souls reassemble in the plain where fates are decided (Harris & Platzner 
2004: 300). It is clear from various biblical texts that “Christianity which inherited many of its 
concepts from Greco-Roman tradition also contributed to the mythic theme of descent into 
the Underworld. According to the New Testament, after his crucifixion Jesus of Nazareth 
descended into Tartarus, preaching to spirits imprisoned in its darkness (1 Pet 3:19; 2 Pet 2:4). 
From these brief passages, a belief developed that Jesus entered the netherworld on Good 
Friday to rescue the souls of righteous persons who had died before he ascended and opened 
the way to heaven. Concepts like the Christian ‘Hades’ come directly from classical culture 
which represents the universality of death’s finality on humanity” (Harris & Platzner 2004: 
286). Hesiod too referred to a so-called post-mortem vindication on the island of the blessed 
as opposed to suffering and punishment that are the fate of the unfortunate (Van Aarde 2011: 
15). In medieval theology this doctrine was known as the harrowing of hell (Harris & Platzner 
2004: 300). Van Aarde adds that in “1 Corinthians 15 the syncretising tendency of an 
assimilation of the Graeco-Roman world with the semitical is even more pronounced” (Van 
Aarde 2011: 8). 
2.6 The Old, the New Testaments and the Intertestamental Period 
The rationale for linking the New Testament to the Old in tracing the tapestry of afterlife 
notions is that the former is seen as a continuation or development of the latter. The New 
Testament Jesus emerges from the Old Testament setting. It is now almost a truism not only 
to say that Jesus lived and died as a Jew, but also that he also rose as a Jew (Crossan 2000: 
31). For Crossan the resurrection question therefore must be the question about the meaning 
of Jesus’ resurrection within its contemporary context. The bodily resurrection of Jesus can 
only be understood correctly within the faith and theology about resurrection present in 
certain circles of Judaism of early Judaism and early Christianity (Crossan 2003: 31). The 
Hebrew Bible which is the entire Bible of the Jews and the Old Testament of the Christians 
was written between ca. 1200 and 125 BCE. 
 On the first reading the Hebrew Bible, an impression can be obtained that the concept of the 
afterlife is foreign to the Hebrew Bible. Throughout the history of the Israelites before the 
first -century common era, no notions of the afterlife existed within the Israelite belief system 
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(Crossan2003: 34). Crossan’s reading of the Hebrew Bible yields the fact that Sheol, which 
was considered the abode of the dead was the ultimate and inevitable end for everyone. In 
that regard, notions of the afterlife in the form of either Hell or Paradise were thought to have 
been borrowed into the Christian Bible from Greco-Roman culture as such concepts did not 
exist in the Hebrew Bible, at least not in the way they are depicted by the New Testament. It 
is clear from the diction of the Hebrew Bible that death meant the end for everyone. Crossan 
points to the juxtaposition of words like ‘sheol/pit, death/sheol, in Psalms 16: 10 and Proverbs 
1:12 respectively as cases in point. Thus, from Isaiah 38:18 at the end of the 8th century to 
Hades in Sir 14:16, death is invariably portrayed as the final closure to human existence 
(Crossan 2003: 34). In conformity to the idea still prevalent in modern Judaism, the only 
afterlife conception would have been to expect to live forever in the memory of ones’ 
descendants, otherwise everyone’s destiny was death and it was final. (Crossan 2003: 34).  
While this observation holds true, there was also another caveat.  Surely, the idea of the 
afterlife could not have been entirely unheard of given the interaction between the Israelites 
and the Egyptians in close proximity. The latter staunchly believed in the afterlife. Indeed, for 
the people that had seen the pyramids of Egypt which were an embodiment of immortality, 
the concept of immortality could not have been altogether unfamiliar. Be that as it may, the 
Hebrew Bible never discusses any types or possibilities of after-life, so we must infer that it 
was considered just one more pagan usurpation of rights and privileges that belonged 
exclusively to God (Crossan 2003: 35).  
 Given such a mundane worldview, all sanctions for good or evil had to take place within 
temporal space and this theology is expressed quite succinctly in Deuteronomy 28. The 
chapter is divided between blessings for obedience and curses for disobedience (Crossan 
2003: 35). The avoidance of the discussion of any concepts of the afterlife is very clear in the 
Hebrew Bible. (Crossan 2003: 35). However, it is when we come to the intertestamental 
period that difficulties irreconcilable with the Deuteronomic theology emerge. A scenario not 
anticipated by the writer of Deuteronomy causes a big problem. The question as how to deal 
with the martyrs who had died under persecution inevitably arose.  In December of 167 BCE 
Antiochus IV Epiphanes launched a religious persecution to destroy the major source of 
opposition to Jerusalem’s becoming a fully functioning Greek city.  
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How could Deuteronomic theology explain martyrdom? Where was the justice of God for the 
tortured and brutalized bodies of martyrs? Crossan focuses on bodily resurrection as one 
answer and sees its arrival in the difference between the first and the second parts of the 
book of Daniel and the difference between 2 Maccabees and 4 Maccabees (Crossan 2003: 37) 
For Crossan, the “first clear reference to life after death can be defined exactly with regard to 
both its date and specific circumstances that produced it” (Crossan 2003: 37). The date is 168 
BCE or thereabouts. Crossan sees Daniel 12:1-3 certainly referring to a resurrection from the 
dead and to an after-life. However, for Crossan Dan 12:1-3 does not envisage a general 
resurrection for all, but a specific one for the very virtuous and the very evil, for the just and 
the martyrs to eternal life and for their oppressors and persecutors to everlasting shame 
(Crossan 2003:37). It is not the same resurrection as envisaged by either the gospels or 1 
Corinthian 15. 
While Crossan suggests that the author of Daniel may be talking about bodily resurrection the 
major difference is that this kind of resurrection would not be a general resurrection (Crossan 
2003:36ff).  While the author of Daniel clearly gives new meaning to ‘dust’ being infused with 
life from Isaiah, it is in 2 Maccabees, especially as compared with the same stories in 4 
Maccabees that bodily resurrection is emphatically and repeatedly asserted. Crossan turns 
his attention to Deuteronomic theology and asserts that Deuteronomistic theology was false 
in its promised blessings and threatened curses (Crossan 2003: 37). The Deuteronomic 
theological grid apparently did not cover all possibilities: 
 There were of course cracks in that Deuteronomic facade such as Job whose sufferings 
were not punishment for sins but a test of his holiness (Job 42:7-8), or the suffering 
servant whose sufferings were not punishment for his sins but vicarious atonement for 
those of others (Isa 52-53) (Crossan 2003:37) 
 For Crossan such a literal resurrection was a “very specific experience at a very specific time 
and place that brought belief in an after-life and in next-worldly sanctions into Judaism for 
the first time” (Crossan 2003: 38). Any earlier reference to the afterlife was symbolic of 
communal revival of Israel as a nation. For example, the “dust” of Isaiah 26:19 being infused 
with life again, and the coming to life of dry bones of Ezekiel 37. According to Crossan, “these 
represented corporal renewal as opposed to individual bodily resurrection” (Crossan 2003: 
38). 
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According to Crossan, the causative background was in general the tension between 
traditional Judaism and invasive Hellenism and the attempt by Syrian monarch Antiochus IV 
Epiphanes to fuse the Jewish homeland politically, socially, and economically into his hard-
pressed empire (Crossan 2003: 38). Very different interpretations of certain Maccabean 
martyrs are given in 2 Maccabees from around 100 BCE and 4 Maccabees from around 40 CE. 
But despite being the same stories, the four accounts give very different interpretations of 
martyrdom and only one mentions bodily resurrection.  Crossan is of the view that “the writer 
of Daniel has certainly taken the ambiguous prophesy of Isaiah 26:19 in a literal sense saying 
that the sleepers in the dust will literally rise” (Crossan 2003: 38). However, Daniel does not 
conceive of a general resurrection of all men but of those people whose unjust treatment in 
this life presents a problem for the writer (Crossan 2003: 38). In this sense, Daniel’s 
conception of resurrection is different from that of Jesus depicted in the Gospels.   
2.7 Paradise or Hell 
Paradise and Hell are two of the most important concepts in the Hebrew/Christian Bible 
where the afterlife is concerned. Craffert (1999: 71) says that “insight into the development 
of the ideas of Sheol and Gehenna brings clarity on one of the cultural constructs about the 
conditions of the afterlife which people in this tradition have expressed”. A study of tombs 
burials and death inevitably includes the question about the possible position of the afterlife 
(Craffert 1999: 71). The notion of ‘hell’ has entered the modern mind through the Judeo-
Christian tradition. Many modern views on the places of the afterlife cannot be divorced from 
their origin in this tradition (Craffert 1999: 71). Hell was a dark pit somewhere underneath 
the earth. It was a dark place from where no one ever returned (Craffert 1999: 71). In the 
Septuagint the Hebrew term Sheol is usually translated with the well-known Greek term 
Hades-the underworld, which receives the dead. As a temporary dwelling place for the dead, 
it is described as a prison (1 Pet 3:19) and a city with gates from which no one escapes. This 
is very much in line with the original meaning and description of Sheol in the Hebrew Bible 
(Craffert 1999: 71).  
The New Testament writings also share the evolved meaning of Hades (Sheol) as an 
intermediate place and as a place of punishment.  According to Luke (16:23, 26) and Acts 
(2:27, 31) all the dead are in Hades while other passages suggest that only the spirits of the 
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ungodly are in Hades (1 Pet 3:19; Rev 20:13f). Different conceptions exist about what happens 
in Hades. Crossan (1999: 71) says that “according to Luke, punishment begins after death in 
Hades while the Book of Revelation maintains that Hades will in the end bring forth all the 
dead for judgement and punishment will be meted out (Luke 16:23, Rev 20:13)”.  
Changing views in other departments of death and the afterlife caused changes in the content 
ascribed to Sheol or Hades (Craffert 1999: 71ff). It was much more a process of creating new 
conceptions for satisfying new needs than of transmitting an established understanding of 
the afterlife (Craffert 1999: 71). Craffert (1999: 71) indicates that “in the Second Temple 
Period, and specifically in the New Testament and some other Jewish texts, one finds a second 
word describing the place of afterlife, called Gehenna (usually translated as hell)”. Gehenna 
is the Greek version of the Hebrew word referring to a valley south of Jerusalem, the valley 
of the sons of Hinnom. In the New Testament and some other Jewish texts of the period, it is 
used in a metaphorical sense as the place of judgement and of fiery punishment at the end of 
time. It is to be distinguished from Hades which houses the dead before the last judgement 
(Craffert 1999: 76). The same texts which developed the notions of resurrection and 
judgement for the wicked also created the concept of Gehenna as a fiery place of eternal 
punishment (Craffert 1999: 76). 
The word Gehenna is used in the Bible in three different senses. The first is merely a reference 
to a piece of land: the well-known valley of Hinnom south of Jerusalem. Today it is known as 
Wadi er-Rababi: “The valley of Hinnom is known from the Hebrew Bible as the boundary 
between the inheritance of Judah and Benjamin and later as the northern border of Judah 
(Jos 15:8, 18:16 and Neh 11:30)” (Craffert 1999: 71ff). A second meaning for the word is found 
in the prophecy of Jeremiah. Here it refers to an extraordinary place of punishment for the 
wicked in the environment of Jerusalem. During the time of the prophet Jeremiah the valley 
of Hinnom became the place of judgement (Jer 7:30-34, 19:1-15). In condemning the valley 
of Hinnom as a place of idol worship, Jeremiah anticipated that it would become a valley of 
slaughter for those who worship there. Because of such negative publicity the Valley of 
Hinnom was used for gruesome purposes. For example, in the second century BCE, the 
Maccabees burned corpses of their enemies in this valley. From this point it was a small step 
for Jewish apocalyptic thought around the first century BCE to see the Valley of Hinnom 
(Gehenna) as the place where the enemies of God would be destroyed in the final judgement 
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(Craffert 1999: 78). Craffert argues that the notion of a fiery judgement was one of the 
components which entered Jewish thought about the afterlife during this period and it was 
the valley of Hinnom which came to represent the place of judgement of the wicked by fire 
at the end of time (1 Enoch 27:1-3) (Craffert 1999: 78).  
The shift from a place of judgement to a place of punishment was a logical development which 
can also be found in these circles. From a valley, geographically associated with Jerusalem, 
Gehenna acquired the metaphorical meaning of a place of judgement and of a fiery 
punishment at the end of times. Craffert believes  
that judgement and punishment in hell were not concepts designed in the first place to 
deal with immoral people or with those who rejected certain doctrinal viewpoints. Rather, 
they were an attempt to deal with an oppressive political and social condition (Craffert 
1999: 78-79).  
The feeling was that if God is righteous then ‘our’ enemies and oppressors (those of the Jewish 
people) will have to be punished. A place of fiery judgement developed together with the 
notion of resurrection as the reward for the righteous (Craffert 1999: 79). 
For Craffert, the final step in the development of this concept is to see Gehenna as an 
otherworldly place of punishment for the wicked after death. It is no longer only the place of 
punishment for the wicked but is associated with the otherworldly place where the ungodly 
and the wicked will receive eternal punishment (Craffert 1999: 81).  Be that as it may some 
New Testament texts project the image that Gehenna existed since creation (see e.g. Matt 
25:41). Craffert believes that Gehenna was conceived both as an immediate place of 
punishment for the souls of the wicked between death and resurrection to final judgement 
and as the place of final judgement for the wicked (Craffert 1999: 81).   
In many New Testament translations, the distinction between underworld and hell has 
disappeared. In the final stage, the development of the concept of Sheol as a place of 
punishment and the notion of Gehenna as a fiery place have merged in popular thought 
(Craffert 1999: 81). This overview also emphasizes the insight that the New Testament has no 
uniform view of the afterlife or of the conditions awaiting the dead (Craffert 1999: 82). A case 
in point is the fact that whereas the Pharisees believed in the afterlife, and in resurrection in 
particular, yet the Sadducees did not (Acts 23:8) The antipole of Hell is paradise or heaven. 
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Paradise in Israelite lore, of course, was the name of the garden of pleasure created by God 
for the first human beings (Gen 2). By Paul’s day however, this place of blessedness was 
transposed into the sky (see Luke 23:43), often referred to as the third or highest level of the 
sky where the righteous dead dwell awaiting the resurrection of the dead (Malina & Pilch 
2008: 185). 
2.8 The Role of the Martyrs 
We have established that the first mention of bodily, individual resurrection can be located 
within the Jewish martyr tradition. Crossan directs attention to the second set of stories which 
appears in Maccabees 7:1-4 and 4 Maccabees 8:1-17. According to Crossan, in the latter 
account the emphasis is possibly on the immortality of the soul. In the former account, 
however, we find a full and clear assertion of bodily resurrection. Crossan insists that for those 
who first proposed it, what created that after-life interpretation and especially its bodily 
understanding was not a philosophical vision of divine character (Crossan 2003: 42). Crossan 
argues that the martyrs in the book of Maccabees had been bodily tortured thus it became 
necessary for them to be vindicated in their bodies hence bodily resurrection.  The justice of 
God would be vindicated above the battered bodies of martyrs.  Bodily resurrection would be 
part and parcel of a justified earth and the final act and grand finale of God’s public vindication 
of murdered martyrs and by extension of all persecuted innocents (Crossan 2003: 42). 
 The general resurrection of the righteous for vindication and the unrighteous for punishment 
was the final eschatological event, the grand finale which established a perfect world, a divine 
utopia here on this earth. “Resurrection was the preserve of the disenfranchised classes of 
people who could not abide foreign domination (Crossan 2003: 8). By contrast immortality of 
the soul was adopted mainly by classes of people who learned Greek culture and benefited 
from it. And if or when eschatology was imminent, apocalyptic eschatology meant the 
destruction not of time and space, earth and world but of evil and violence, injustice and 
unrighteousness (Crossan 2003: 42).   
2.9 Witnesses of Resurrection  
 Resurrection appearances alongside the empty tomb are the fulcrum on which conservative 
theologians rest their arguments on the truthfulness of resurrection. For Crossan, “what is 
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stunningly original is claims of empty tomb and the visions” (Crossan 2003: 34). As has been 
pointed out, the empty tomb can be explained away in many different ways. It is the 
resurrection visions which seem to defy explanation.  Wright’s view is that the bodily 
resurrection of Jesus provides the only sufficient and necessary explanation for the New 
Testament accounts of the empty tomb and resurrection appearances (Wright 2003: 696). 
However, as has already been intimated, some liberal scholars, dismiss resurrection 
appearances as hallucinations. Gerd Luedemann explains the various appearances of Jesus in 
terms of a combination of bereavement hallucinations, mass psychosis and Jungian depth 
psychology (Luedemann 1995: 93-94). The argument is that Peter’s state of mind immediately 
following Jesus’ crucifixion was such that it is hardly surprising that he received a vision- in 
effect, subjective bereavement hallucination -of the risen Lord. Not only was he in a state of 
mourning over the loss of his beloved Master, he was also racked by feelings of guilt for his 
denial in the high priest’s courtyard (Mark 14:66-72, Luedemann 1995:94). In Peter’s case, 
the mourning process was hindered not only by this event, but by the sudden, unexpected 
nature of Jesus’ death, as well as his continued dependence on Jesus. Luedemann builds a 
case for the argument that Peter’s vision was the means through which he came to terms 
with his trauma, and which helped him make sense of Jesus, not as a failed messiah, but as a 
living presence made possible by God’s vindication of him (Luedemann 1995: 94). 
 The criticism levelled against this position is the following: Whereas hallucinations can occur 
only to individuals, since they emanate from within and are not generated by objective 
external stimuli, collective hallucinations then would be problematic (Habermas 2001). Smith 
adds, “. . . hallucinations are by definition subjective experiences that cannot have a shared 
origin, they are generated in the brain of the individual” (Smith 2019: 60). 
 Another common objection to the hallucination hypothesis is the so-called ‘beaten men’ 
argument (Cupitt 1985: 163) which posits the view that Jesus’ crucifixion would have ended 
any hopes the disciples had of acclaiming him as Messiah. This traumatic event would have 
left them in despair, and so far from expecting his return it was only an earth-shattering 
phenomenon such as his bodily resurrection that could have accounted for their sudden 
transformation from ‘beaten men’ to fearless and joyous proponents of the gospel (Wilckens 
1968: 61). As Smith observes, this approach requires certain assumptions to be made and 
overlooks some crucial data (Smith 2019: 54). Contrary to this ‘beaten man’ hypothesis, the 
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transformation of the disciples’ demeanour seems not to have been quite as sudden and 
dramatic as is often claimed (Smith 2019: 54). Their initial reaction to seeing the empty tomb 
and the risen Jesus is reported to have been one of fear and bewilderment (Matt 28:8-10, 
Mark 16:8, Luke 24:37), as well as non-recognition (Luke 24:16, John 20:15, 21:4) and even 
unbelief (Matt 28:17, Luke 24:41, John 20:24-29) (Smith 2019). 
 But what could they have “seen” when Jesus’ followers claimed to have seen the resurrected 
Christ? “The ecclesial attempt to evaluate visionary experiences has produced a certain 
amount of theological reflection on their character” (Gelpi 1971: 151). Gelpi’s view is that 
there are two categories of visions. “A privileged place is, of course retained for the 
experience of the risen Christ prior to his ascension, such visions are traditionally called 
corporeal visions” (Gelpi 1971: 151). Other types of visionary experience are ordinarily 
referred to as ‘imaginative’ (Gelpi 1971: 151) “The history of mysticism makes it clear that the 
imaginative and conceptual content of visions tends to be a function of the personal history 
and psychological development of the individual visionary” (Gelpi 2019: 151). This fact and 
the psychic similarity of visions to hallucinatory experiences have led theologians to a prudent 
scepticism in the face of any claims concerning the divine origin of a given visionary 
experience” (Gelpi 1971: 151). 
  Furthermore, recent literature from psychology has shown that, “courtroom testimony by 
an eyewitness is preceded by a varied and dynamic set of psychological processes” (Wells & 
Turtle 1987: 363). Wells and Turtle argue that given the complex interaction of perception, 
memory, judgement, social influence and communication processes that lead up to an 
eyewitness’s story of what happened, it should hardly be surprising that such testimony often 
is a faulty version of the original event” (Wells & Turtle 1987:363). In fact, as recently as 1974 
an eyewitness researcher claimed in a major article that “eyewitness testimony is unreliable” 
(Wells & Turtle 1987: 365).  “[W]hether a witness’s memory for an event is irreversibly 
distorted by exposure to misleading post event information or whether the memory remains 
intact but is not accessed is somewhat controversial” (Wells & Turtle 1987:363). Could 
resurrection narratives simply be what biblical scholars have termed vaticinia ex eventu, that 
is reconstructions after the fact? Smith believes that the reason for the continuing impasse 
between the realists and the illusionists is that neither side engages seriously enough with 
the psychological and psychiatric literature in the field (Smith: Abstract). 
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 It would appear as if Paul uses his visions of the resurrected Christ to buttress his apostolic 
claims. Smith notices that Paul makes no attempt to distinguish his own experience from that 
of the other apostles (Smith 2019: 54). Smith opines that this was a premeditated decision on 
the part of Paul (Smith 2019: 54). This recalls what was laid down as the main qualification 
for joining the apostolic college (Acts 1:22 One should have ‘seen’ the resurrected Christ.  2 
Corinthians 10 indicates that Paul’s apostleship was being questioned. It is, however, the 
disparities in the three accounts of Paul’s visions of the resurrected Christ in the book of Acts 
which cast aspersions on Paul’s integrity. More so if we consider that the “Gospels themselves 
from the 18th century began to be seen as highly edited reports that were either based on 
unreliable witnesses or altogether devoid of any first-hand witnesses.” The sacred authors 
agree that after his crucifixion and burial, Jesus was seen ‘alive’ by different people on more 
than one occasion (Pilch 2004:14). Pilch argues that these people, then are witnesses of him 
being raised from the dead (Pilch 2004:14). In addition to the apostles, these witnesses 
include Paul and Stephen and many others unnamed (Pilch 2004: 14). A question that 
ineluctably arises is the ontology of resurrected bodies. Socio-scientific criticism is well 
position to reveal the nature of ancient Mediterranean.   
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review: The Historical Jesus Research 
3.1 Hermann Samuel Reimarus 
As has been alluded to in the foregoing, the critical study of the Bible was a natural response 
to what were perceived to be weaknesses in the traditional interpretive methods. Most 
scholars situate the resurrection debate within what has become known as the Historical 
Jesus research. Herman Samuel Reimarus is generally considered to be the pioneer in 
Historical Jesus research. Reimarus had asked whether resurrection was rationally 
conceivable, having denied the miracles and the supernatural associated with it (Reimarus 
1766). The first real preoccupation with the historical-critical methods began in earnest with 
Herman Samuel Reimarus whose initial response to the question of the historicity of Jesus 
was to dismiss it as deliberate deception (Reimarus 1766).  Other scholars however   go even 
further back in time and cite English deists as the real precursors of the religion of reason 
(Theissen & Merz 1998: 2). Furthermore, Gowler believes that Reimarus’ ideas were 
“anticipated by Spinoza and Pierre Bayle” (Gowler 2007: 4). Be that as it may, Reimarus is still 
regard as the pioneer of the study of the life of Jesus from a purely historical perspective 
(Theissen & Merz 1998: 3). Reimarus’ contributions make a complete break from the 
traditional way of reading the Bible. In reference to the contributions of Reimarus, Theissen 
and Merz make the following observation: “The Methodological starting point is above all 
pioneering. Reimarus distinguishes the preaching of Jesus from the apostles’ faith in Christ” 
(Theissen and Merz 1998: 3). For Reimarus, resurrection is a well thought-out and well-
orchestrated deception that begins with the disciples of Jesus stealing his body and then 
waiting for fifty days at which time his body is no longer recognizable to begin to proclaim 
that Jesus had been resurrected.  
3.2 Albert Schweitzer: The Quest for the Historical Jesus  
The historical-critical reading of the Bible especially the New Testament has also become 
known as the ‘Quest for the Historical Jesus’: “This quest for the historical Jesus began during 
the Enlightenment period which celebrated the powers of human reason and explored the 
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world through a scientific approach” (Growler 2007: 3). The emphasis on reason and natural 
laws made some to people to question belief in a God who intervened in history in 
‘supernatural’ ways.  Scientific investigation became the basis for evaluating the historicity of 
the Gospel texts (Gowler 2007:3). The Quest for the Historical Jesus’ is the title of Albert 
Schweitzer’s highly controversial book which has come to characterise the whole enterprise 
of trying to determine who the real historical Jesus was (Schweitzer 1998, Le Beau, 
Greenspoon, Hamm 2000:1).  
 3.3 David Friedrich Strauss 
 Shunning both the traditional and the rationalist approach, David Friedrich Strauss opted for 
the ‘third way’.  This would be a way of looking at the life and the teachings of Jesus as myths 
(Thiessen & Merz 1998: 3, Gowler 2007: 6). This method was already current in the Old 
Testament of Strauss’ time (Theissen & Merz 1998: 3). “Strauss’s contribution is difficult to 
overestimate in that the irreconcilable differences in the gospels meant that scholars could 
no longer view them as unvarnished historical narratives” (Gowler 2007: 6-7). Strauss had 
demonstrated that the gospels were not equally reliable historically, so scholars began to 
explore more fully the dates of composition, sources of, and literary relationships among the 
Gospels (Gowler 2007: 8).  
3.4 Historical-Critical Methods 
The historical-critical method has maintained dominance over Historical Jesus Research over 
the last two hundred years. It is a child of the Enlightenment period. The premodern and 
modern periods basically agreed on the objectivity of reality (Du Rand 2005: 219). In 
modernism, knowledge comes from what is experiential, empirical and factual (Du Rand 
2005: 219). The modernist believed that in a world where everything is collapsing, you needed 
objectivity so that the truth is the same, from place to place and from timely, to timeless so 
that the truth is unchanging (Du Rand 2005: 219). 
 With historical-criticism, theological interpretation has sought validation in facticity behind 
the text (Du Rand 2005: 219). This new methodology, also known as the naturalist way, sought 
to explain away all the claims to the miraculous through rationalist explanations, hence it was 
also known as the rationalist method. This method was mainly based on Hume’s assertion of 
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analogy and antecedent probability. The analogy principle and the doctrine of antecedent 
probability simply state that any claims that certain things happened in the past and these 
same things do not happen in the present should be rejected as false. A good illustration of 
this principle in so far as the life of Jesus is concerned comes from Crossan: “Such things as 
virginal conceptions, divine births, miraculous powers, resurrections and ascensions never 
have happened and never could happen. They are opposed to physical law and/or divine 
consistency” (Crossan 2003: 30). Barth sought a rational approach to the scriptures and 
therefore would not accept the miraculous into his biblical reflections. He could not shift his 
thinking to acknowledge God acting historically in the world (Barth 1960:452). Karl Barth is a 
good example of a deist. According to deism, “God is indeed the creator of everything and 
exists in sublime elevation above all things, but he does not reveal himself and does not allow 
himself to be known in the life and history of humanity” (Moller 1998: 93). 
Gerd Luedemann explains various appearances of Jesus in terms of a combination of 
bereavement hallucinations, mass psychosis and Jungian depth psychology (Luedemann in 
Smith 2019: 58). Regarding the reference to the more than five hundred who are referred to 
as having seen the resurrected Jesus, Gilmour dismisses these visions as an outbreak of 
psychologically generated mass ecstasy. According to Smith, many psychologists call mass 
hysteria, mass psychogenic illness or mass sociogenic illness (Smith 2019: 58). A criticism 
levelled against these liberal scholars is that they “rely too much on pure speculation and tend 
to lack the methodological precision required to make their arguments convincing” (Smith 
2019: 54-55). Moreover, we cannot go back into the first century and analyse the 
psychological make up of those visionaries about whom the claim is made that they saw the 
resurrected Jesus. 
From orthodox scholars, Wright is very clear about the role of bodily resurrection. For him it 
was the conviction that the tomb was found empty, along with claims that Jesus had been 
seen alive on Easter Sunday, that gave rise to the unshakeable faith of the first Christians 
(Wright 2003: 696). For orthodox scholars like Wright, the growth of the Christian movement 
hinges on two aspects namely the empty tomb and the resurrection visions. Referring to the 
empty tomb and the resurrection appearances, Wright says the following: “…the combination 
of empty tomb and appearances of the living Jesus forms a set of circumstances which is itself 
both necessary and sufficient for the rise of early Christian belief. Without these phenomena, 
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we cannot explain why this belief came into existence, and took the shape it did. With them, 
we can explain it exactly and precisely” (Wright 2003: 696). To reach this position however, 
Wright makes certain assumptions, which assumptions are wrong (Smith 2019: 56) Wright 
argues that these strands of tradition namely, the empty tomb tradition and post resurrection 
experiences can be considered to be historically secure. However, Smith argues, “few 
professional historians today regard any even of the past, especially the distant past, as 
‘historically secure in the manner Wright seems to mean” (Smith 2019: 57). Smith (2019: 57) 
further says that “Wright’s intention at this point is to demonstrate that no explanation but 
his own can account for the disciples’ reaction to these events and the rapid development of 
the church during the following years”. This study will mainly focus on the post-resurrection 
appearances because the empty tomb claim can be explained in terms of other causes. 
To refute the centrality of post-resurrection appearances, Smith points out that “apart from 
the twelve apostles and their associates (Acts 1:15) every other Christian came to faith 
without having seen either the empty tomb or the risen Jesus (John 20:29)” (Smith 2019: 57). 
Smith is correct in asserting that subsequent believers believed on the strength of the 
apostles’ testimony (Smith 2019: 57). Thus, the empty tomb could not have been the 
necessary impetus for the rise of Christianity let alone the only ‘necessary and sufficient’ 
explanation. However, the question that naturally arises is the question as to what it was 
about the apostles’ testimonies that contributed to such exponential growth of the Christian 
faith. Another question might be asked as well: What is it about the teaching and preaching 
of the kerygma especially its Pentecostal variety that still causes people to become Christ 
followers en masse? This question will be answered in the following pages.  
 Pannenberg rejects the view that Jesus’ resurrection could not have happened, nor that it 
might not have a logical historical claim because it does not express analogy. To him the 
“judgement about whether or not an event, however unfamiliar, has happened is in the final 
analysis a matter for the historian and cannot be prejudged by the knowledge of natural 
science” (Pannenberg 1968: 98). Gibson expresses a problem with using logic as a basis for 
disproving Jesus’ resurrection from the dead. He argues that logic cannot be the sole arbiter 
of truth since it cannot account for exceptions (Gibson in Porter, Hays & Tombs 1999: 19). He 
deals quite cogently with David Hume’s principle of analogy and antecedent probability.  
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Licona, another orthodox scholar, maintains that a miracle is a historical event which can be 
determined as such because it would inevitably leave evidence of an occurrence of some sort 
behind (Licona 2010: 29). Such a view however opens Licona up for attack. As will be shown 
later, what leaves evidence is not necessarily all there is to reality.  
Historical criticism, however, has more aspects to it than just the historical aspects. Historical 
criticism involves looking at geographical locale, authorship of a document in addition to the 
actual historical data. This composite approach to the interpretation of the biblical text 
originated in the early part of the nineteenth century, particularly in Germany. The rational 
study of the Bible was encouraged by the introduction of theology as part of the university 
secular syllabus. The historical interpretation of the Bible was focused on the question of how 
much we really can know about the historical Jesus (Du Rand 2005: 160).  
 3.5 Andries Van Aarde 
One of the most prolific contributors to the resurrection debate in South Africa is Andries G 
Van Aarde who is a New Testament scholar of the University of Pretoria.  Van Aarde observes 
that different viewpoints on how to interpret the evidence of Jesus’ resurrection are possible. 
Before he continues to articulate his ‘trajectory of five links’ Van Aarde echoes the idea of the 
finality of death to preclude any notions of resurrection in the Hebrew Bible.  For Van Aarde, 
the context of the resurrection texts is “the eastern Mediterranean view that Sheol forms an 
unbridgeable chasm between those who are dead and those who are alive, as well as between 
the dead and God” (Van Aarde, Walsh 2007: 71-84). After three days, the death of a body was 
permanent (1 Sam 30:12). Van Aarde also asserts that in Babylonian mythology the expression 
of three days referred to the time it took to journey from the land of the living to the land of 
the dead  ̶Sheol (Van Aarde 2011: 8): “After three days’ therefore underscores the finality of 
death” (Van Aarde 2011: 8). 
 For those who might interpret Isaiah 26:19 to mean individual bodily resurrection, Van Aarde 
has an answer for them. The metaphor ‘dust’ is found in Isaiah 26:19. “Though dust is seen as 
referring to people in Sheol, here the metaphor should be understood in terms of another 
context. Van Aarde points out that exegetes generally accept that the dead here refers to 
Israelites as a cooperate personality just as in Ezekiel 37:11-14. Reference therefore is not to 
resurrection per se “but to regeneration of Israel as a nation” (Van Aarde 2011: 9). For Van 
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Aarde the sources of our resurrection material are the gospels which developed in an 
evolutionary process as early Christian folklore that was based chiefly on anonymous sources 
(Van Aarde 2011: 4). Van Aarde asserts that resurrection faith of the first Christ followers can 
be explained in terms of the concept ‘new creation’ (Van Aarde 2011: 3). For him “reference 
to the empty tomb tradition forms part of a development of early Christian folklore which 
was brought to a close with motifs related to a ‘tomb cult’ worshipping Jesus as the 
resurrected Christ” (Van Aarde 2011: 2). Van Aarde demonstrates that the tomb cult of the 
early Christians might be originating prior to Constantinian Christendom (Van Aarde 2011: 2). 
Van Aarde maintains that the tomb cult of the earliest Christ-followers could be the historical 
culmination of a socio-cultural development which is rooted in pre-Greco-Roman times (Van 
Aarde 2011: 3).  Van Aarde’s theory hinges on the presumed borrowing of traditions into the 
early Christian tradition from the Greco-Roman myths of creation. Van Aarde draws parallels 
between the stories of Jesus and those of legendary heroes in classical mythology: “As with 
virginal conception, I do not trace the empty tomb tradition to the Jesus faction in Jerusalem 
but to common Greek thinking that manifested in the stories of the deification of Heracles” 
(Van Aarde 2011: 20).  
According to Van Aarde, the “myths of virginal conceptions, ascensions to heaven and 
being adopted by the gods are almost recycled ideas.” “These stories were not only very 
familiar in the first century Greco-Roman world but also came to mind when gentile 
philosophers of that period reflected on what Christians said about Jesus, the child of 
God” (Van Aarde 2001: 183). Van Aarde paints a theo-anthropological picture that 
consists of several building blocks, such as the socio-psychological world of a three-
dimensional cosmological theism (Van Aarde 2001: 183). Van Aarde points out that in 
this world the divine is experienced as normal in everyday life. Everydayness, however, 
could rapidly become altered with transcendent experience that can be described as 
alternate states of consciousness (Van Aarde 2011: 5).  Van Aarde quotes Craffert who 
remarks that “Jesus is presented as a figure who on all accounts started his public life 
based on an altered state of consciousness experience and who according to the reports 
together with his followers have often experienced altered states of consciousness” 
(Craffert in Van Aarde 2001: 183). Van Aarde (2001: 188) says that  
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Paul developed a theological construct of participation in the risen Christ. This unity 
with the cause of Jesus was a faith experience that can be described as an altered 
state of consciousness because of its spiritual nature...because God turns shame 
into honour, the resurrection faith is according to Paul the sign of a new birth, a 
new start and a new creation.  
Zorodzai Dube is a New Testament scholar based at the University of Pretoria.  Dube points 
out that most previous scholarly discussion on Jesus’ passion and resurrection focused on the 
context, development and oral circulation of the story of Jesus (Dube 2013: 107). What is 
conspicuous for Dube in the earlier scholarly discussion is the failure by scholars to address 
the question as to how the Jesus story, ordinary as it been in the beginning, became a 
community story (Dube 2013).  To fill this gap, Dube employs the ‘cultural trauma theory’ in 
order to explore processes through which a story moves (and in our case the story of Jesus’ 
passion and resurrection) from being a particular incident to a point whereby it is presented 
as a collective trauma story (Dube 2013: 107).  According to Dube the theory focuses on social 
processes used to make listeners feel that they were attacked in a similar way (Dube 2013: 
107).  
Dube’s analysis yields the fact that the Jesus story began as a single event among many other 
similar stories. However, Jesus’ tragic event became an experience that resonated with or 
was felt as replicating the experience of many first century Jesus followers (Dube 2013: 107ff).  
For Dube the question that naturally arises is the question as to what social processes made 
the tragic event that Jesus faced become a community story? Dube suggests that cultural 
trauma theory can help to answer questions regarding the social process that changes an 
event into a collective story. Dube identifies one cultural symbol in the life of Jesus which 
resonated with the community’s own experience.  Dube singles out the resurrection of Jesus 
symbol, a claim which is relevant for the present study (Dube 2013: 107).  
While the suffering of Jesus evoked cultural trauma regarding the suffering of the community, 
yet on the positive side, Jesus’ resurrection evoked hope (Dube 2013: 107). Dube apparently 
concurs with scholars who believe that Mark 16:9-20 was not originally part of the story and 
that it was added later to give hope and functioned as a dirge (Dube 2013: 107). An inference 
can be drawn from this observation, namely that Dube rejects, though subtly, the New 
Testament claims of Jesus’ resurrection. He rejects orthodox scholars’ assertion that bodily 
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resurrection provides the necessary and sufficient explanation for the New Testament 
accounts of the empty tomb and resurrection appearances. 
According to Dube, Hellenism brought the idea that death is a way of achieving glorious fame, 
deification and immortality. The Hellenistic world was full of stories whereby people gave 
their lives for the benefit of others (Dube 2013: 107). For example, Heracles’ own death 
encouraged his soldiers to die a noble death in war when fighting against Erginus. Death was 
noble and rewarding especially when one died on behalf of others. It was greeted with 
eulogies and honour. Heracles’ own death was recounted to some length to underscore his 
courage and the noble way in which he faced death (Dube 2013: 107). Dube believes that the 
Markan community viewed Jesus’ resurrection as a mythical victory for the community. In 
view of the suffering, the community viewed the resurrection as a soother and reversal of 
their situation.  
Dube’s objective is to demonstrate how cultural trauma theory focuses on the social 
processes that are involved in representing an event as a collective experience. His study 
suggests how a first-century community might have heard the story about the death and 
resurrection of Jesus as a story that resonated with their own social situation. While Dube 
seems unconcerned with the veracity of the claim of Jesus’ resurrection, an inference can be 
drawn from the way he draws parallels between characters in classical mythology and what 
Jesus is said to have gone through in terms of his passion and resurrection. The fact that Dube 
tells his readers that the story of Jesus had not come from onlookers immediately after the 
events belies the view that the stories of Jesus at least for Dube, were just that, stories. This 
is reinforced by Dube’s quoting of other scholars as maintaining that the church itself created 
the hope of resurrection (Dube 2013: 108). Dube also quotes Green who maintains: “It is 
possible to argue that the psycho-cultural worldview generated a perception among the 
Markan community that their suffering was worthwhile or noble” (Green in Dube 2013: 108) 
 Dube seems to be saying right from the outside that the story of Jesus was just one of the 
many stories current at the time. It is not the uniqueness of the Jesus’ stories that fascinates 
Dube, but rather how such an everyday life became ‘headline news’, to use his own metaphor. 
A discerning reading of Dube’s article can yield a conclusion that the story of the resurrection 
of Jesus was a normal story created by the first-century Christians. In addition, Dube’s diction 
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is instructive. The words like ‘symbol’ and ‘mythical’ recall earlier attempts by scholars to 
reduce resurrection to symbols and myths, over and against orthodox claims of individual 
bodily resurrection. This analysis is quite revealing of the psycho-social process that may have 
aided the development and growth of the Christian faith. Critics however point to the 
weakness of psycho-social theories in so far as they purport to analyse the mental/social 
states of first century Christians. There is no way of us going back in time to the first century 
to examine primitive Christians and their psychological states. Not surprisingly, New 
Testament scholars who hinge their theories on psychoanalyzing first century Christians have 
been accused of speculation in their studies. 
A summary of this article can distil the conclusions that the idea of resurrection in the Gospel 
of Mark is an editorial interpolation and that the Hebrew Bible does not have notions of 
resurrection, therefore the only source of the notions of the afterlife are Hellenistic myths.  
Furthermore, it can be inferred that this story was not even unique as similar stories were in 
circulation within the setting of the Greco-Roman milieu. How then does such a story become 
‘headline news’ when similar stories are quickly forgotten? It is through the trauma theory 
that such a common story is made to resonate not only with the sufferings of a community 
but also with their hopes and aspirations. While the initial spread of the doctrine of Jesus may 
have been spurred on through the aid of identification with what Jesus suffered, what has 
sustained this teaching over the last one thousand years? Why does Christianity, especially its 
Pentecostal variety continue to grow exponentially? Such are the gaps that need to be filled 
in further research. 
3.6 Markus Cromhout 
Cromhout’s study is aided by the insights of ethnicity theory and social identity theories in 
postulating that contemporary notions of the resurrection or afterlife should be seen 
continuously open to challenge and transformation through the acquisition of experiential 
knowledge. Cromhout maintains that Paul’s understanding of the resurrection of Jesus 
showed both continuities and discontinuities with the Israelite knowledge system and cycle 
of meaning (Cromhout 2011: 30). The implication is that no one meaning of resurrection is 
cast in stone and that no one meaning of resurrection is ‘the’ correct one. 
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3.7 James Crossley 
Crossley reviews different contemporary scholarly positions on the resurrection of Jesus vis- 
a-viz their cultural, social and political locations. His discussion includes analyses of liberalism, 
otherness, atheism, reason and rationality and revolutionary readings, with reference to a 
range of leading contemporary writers on the resurrection of Jesus. He looks at the way in 
which “different historical critical positions on the resurrection buy into contemporary 
political and cultural positions of religious history” (Crossley 2011: 49).  
As has been pointed out, there are divergent views on whether in fact resurrection took place 
in space and time depending on the interpretive method one assumes. Indeed, the question 
whether resurrection is to be understood in the light of the norms of modern historiography 
continues to pervade current Historical Jesus Research. Licona (2009:3) answers this question 
in the affirmative and confirms that it is possible to have miraculous elements within modern 
historiography (Licona 2009: 3)  
 3.8 Michael Licona 
Micheal R Licona is a South African New Testament scholar whose works by his own admission 
are motivated by the desire to provide material for apologetics. Licona in his book, The 
resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach (2010) confesses that throughout the 
writing of his book he was unable to suspend his default theological position of a believer to 
be able to undertake objective work for more than a month at a time.  Licona has since 
relocated to the United States of America where he heads a missions department of one of 
the country’s biggest conservative evangelical mainline churches. The resurrection of Jesus: A 
New Historiographical Approach is an aptly titled revision of his 2008 University of Pretoria 
doctoral dissertation. Licona claims that notwithstanding invaluable contributions over the 
last two centuries to the resurrection debate by many New Testament scholars, there remains 
a gap in the knowledge market where the resurrection of Jesus methodology is concerned. It 
is this gap in the secondary literary methods on the resurrection of Jesus that Licona sets out 
to fill (Licona 2010). 
Licona seems to presuppose that the resurrection of Jesus is a historical fact.  For Licona the 
only “reason why biblical scholars fail to agree on the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus 
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is that they do not engage the historical question fully aware of the philosophical and 
methodological foundations of the task” (Licona 2010: 19). In The Resurrection of Jesus: A 
New Historiographical Approach, Licona discusses at considerable length the major 
methodological issues, the relevant textual data and various current scholarly hypotheses 
pertinent to the investigation of the resurrection of Jesus as a historical event. Licona is of the 
view that biblical scholars “are trying to undertake a historical investigation without the kind 
of training or considerations taken for granted by professional historians” (Licona 2010: 20).  
Licona claims in the cited work that very little has been written by professional historians 
about the life of Jesus and he sees his task as that of investigating the question of the 
historicity of Jesus’ resurrection while providing unprecedented interaction with the 
literature of professional historians outside of the community of biblical scholars on both 
hermeneutical and methodological considerations (Licona 2010: 20). While Licona applauds 
recent historical investigations into the resurrection of Jesus by such scholars as NT Wright, 
James D Dunn and Dale Alison, his opinion of them however is that while they may be useful 
on other grounds, they fail to address the methodological issues pertinent to the investigation 
of the historicity of the resurrection question. Licona deals with what he opines to be 
important considerations relative to the historical inquiry of the truth of ancient texts (Licona 
2010: 29-132). Under the section of ancient texts, Licona claims that to a certain degree the 
objectivity of an investigator in the resurrection research is influenced by his interpretive 
‘horizon’. The ‘horizons’ he defines as the theological or atheistic/theistic presuppositions 
that one brings to the interpretive task, whichever case applies.  He also discusses the idea 
that with issues as far removed from us in time as the first century, investigators of 
resurrection should not be too absolute about the certainty of their historical knowledge or 
results of their investigations. He would rather say that, this was probable given what we 
know about the situation (Licona 2010: 29ff). This sentiment is shared by Stephen H. Smith 
(2019).  
Licona also discusses such issues as the nature of historical fact, post-modern and modernist-
realist approaches in relation to questions of truth and verifiability. In addition, he discusses 
kinds of historical argumentation and what he calls the spectrum of historical certainty. For 
Licona, the accuracy of historical descriptions may be held with varying degrees of certainty 
(Licona 2010: 89). Licona defines truth in terms of correspondence. He argues that competing 
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hypotheses can be evaluated based on the degree to which they correspond to what is known 
to have occurred (Licona 2010: 92-93).  
Later in the book Licona lays out five criteria against which hypotheses may be evaluated, viz, 
their explanatory scope, their explanatory power, their plausibility, their non-reliance on ad 
hoc and nonevidenced assumptions and their ability to illuminate related areas of historical 
inquiry (Licona: 2010: 109-111). In the same chapter Licona enumerates six suggestions that 
he considers one could use to mitigate against preconceived biases in resurrection 
investigation. In chapter 2 of his book, Licona discusses various objections to miracles and 
their historicity. While Licona is persuasive with his incorporation of secular historical 
methodology some have expressed reservations about subjecting such religious phenomena 
to such strict historical enquiry. They argue that “these acts are not human but divine and 
most commentators argue history must stop where divinity begins” (Segal in Smith 2019: 57). 
He further says that “naturally, the view that Jesus was raised from the dead and vindicated 
by God is in itself non-falsifiable since it lies beyond the critical scope of scientific and 
historical investigation. In that sense, it can only exist as a faith event” (Segal in Smith 2019: 
57).   
As social-scientific interpreters would be quick to show us, there exists another realm of 
reality that may not be amenable to Licona’s historiography. A miracle for Licona is an event 
in history for which natural explanations are inadequate (Licona 2010: 134). This definition 
leaves a lot to be desired, this is because we cannot call everything a miracle because there 
are presently no adequate explanations for it.  In addition, Licona asserts the following. “We 
may recognize that an event is a miracle when the event (1) is extremely unlikely to have 
occurred given the circumstances and or natural law and (2) A miracle occurs in an 
environment or context charged with religious significance. As it is to be expected, Licona has 
been criticised for such arbitrary standards against which to judge whether a miracle has 
taken place or not.  Another criticism levelled against Licona is that his criterion of 
adjudicating a miracle seems more oriented to how the event is interpreted by percipients 
than to any kind of historical determination of its cause. Ultimately, argues Licona, an 
assessment of an event as an anomaly or a miracle ultimately turns on the historian’s 
disposition for or against a theistic view of the universe (Licona 2010: 155). Licona then 
discusses the historical sources and the evaluation of their credibility. Where Christian 
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sources are concerned, Licona argues, they must provide access to apostolic teaching. An 
inference can therefore be drawn that an apostolic connection validates certain sources. This 
sounds like Flavius Josephus’ criteria which based the traditional/confessional reading of the 
Hebrew Bible on certain authors among other criteria.  
After some lengthy discussions, Licona gives each text a rating on a scale from ‘unlikely’ to 
‘highly probable’ that the text could provide useful information for the question at hand or 
indeterminate or not ‘useful’ where necessary. For the most part, Licona’s judgements 
concerning the value of these various texts as sources for independent information about 
Jesus’ resurrection are beyond any real dispute, but some scholars contend that there are a 
few instances where the nature of the textual evidence seems to demand a more nuanced 
approach.  Licona is also criticised for omitting Ignatius, a source with clear connections with 
the so-called apostolic pedigree. Lest he sounds like the traditional interpreters, Licona is 
quick to point out that where canonical Gospels are concerned, divine inspiration or general 
trustworthiness must be excluded as having any bearing on a judgement of the Gospel’s 
historical value. 
In chapter 4, Licona deals with additional criteria for adjudicating a miracle namely Jesus’ 
reputation as miracle worker and exorcist, his purported self-understanding as God’s 
eschatological agent and his predictions of his own death and vindication (Licona 2010: 281-
302). The point of this is to establish that the events and experiences after Jesus’ crucifixion 
may be situated in what he calls ‘a significantly charged religious context’, which is his major 
criterion for calling those experiences miraculous. Positive appraisals of these two features of 
Jesus’ life namely his reputation as a miracle worker and his self-understanding as God’s 
eschatological agent are sufficiently well founded, according to Licona so that he can argue 
for a religiously charged context of the resurrection experiences (Licona 2010: 302).   
Critics have said that readers will remain unconvinced that such an event as the resurrection 
of Jesus can be proved historically.  More so given, the opaqueness in which the resurrection 
sightings are depicted in the Gospels. While Licona’s intention in penning this book is clear, 
namely to appropriate skills of professional historians into biblical studies (Licona 2010: 18-
19), it is really doubtful whether the nature of phenomena as described by the gospels is 
amenable to his envisaged historiography. It would seem from Licona’s approach in this book 
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that by this he means to assert not only something about the character of the resurrection as 
an event in space and time but also that to investigate the resurrection of Jesus historically 
means to investigate its historicity. Scholars, however, point out to the other things that could 
be at stake, for example the ‘textual, theological or reception-historical research, all of which 
are aspects of historical research broadly understood. For Licona, at least in this book, history 
is defined as “past events that are the object of study” (Licona 2010: 30).  
The historical study of Jesus however extends far beyond the question of whether it was 
bodily and veridical and whether it left enough evidence upon which historical and biblical 
scholars today may base an evaluation of historicity. Licona is accused of collapsing the 
resurrection into the quest for only determining whether Jesus’ resurrection can be proved 
as a historical fact. For Licona if the methodology is correct the sources are judiciously 
assessed, and the horizons are held in check then it is the end of story. Critics are of the view 
that ‘It must be added that the impact of Jesus’ resurrection on early Christianity, theology, 
community and mission are also topics worthy of study, but these are topics that should not 
be confused with or diminished into basic questions of historicity.   
Furthermore, Viviers says the following about the similarities between Africa and ancient 
Mediterranean world: “Being South Africans on the African continent, we should have already 
detected remarkable similarities between traditional African and the Ancient Mediterranean 
world (Viviers 2005). African Traditional Religions do not have problems with the concept of 
the afterlife or the living dead.  Comparisons between the African Traditional Religions and 
many Pentecostal communities in South Africa some of whom have ‘resurrected’ their 
congregants abound, but these are unfortunately conspicuous by their absence in Licona’s 
work. Licona comes from a confessional tradition whose point of departure is that after all 
the apostles died, no miracle can be expected. Furthermore, his belief that God does not talk 
to people directly precludes any possibility of alternate reality.  
What is at issue regarding Licona’s work is a problematic epistemology.  Licona would be a 
good example of a western interpreter who is “culturally challenged” even though he is 
African (Pilch 2004: 145). I say here ‘African’ advisedly. In Africa it is almost a truism that there 
exists an unseen reality in our worldview. Pilch describes interpreters like Licona as those who 
are deprived parts of human consciousness or excluded from sections of reality (Pilch 2004: 
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145). Allison (2005) maintains that if historical reasoning cannot verify the orthodox version 
of events it likewise cannot falsify them. The gist of this statement is simply that historical 
reasoning alone is simply insufficient to verify the actuality of biblical events. 
Other perspectives which came to the fore at a New Testament Society conference in South 
Africa include archaeological, socio-political and literary:   
Dijkhuizen (2011: 115) argues that the reconstruction of the event of Jesus’ burial needs to 
take into account the archaeological, socio-political and literary evidence. For her, historical 
evidence in the form of norms and practices in the first century with regard to the burial of 
victims of crucifixion and the literary evidence, prove the burial of Jesus took place. Decock 
(2011: 76) sees resurrection as a process of reintegration into the body of Christ (Deacock 
2011: 76). For Decock “[l]ife in the present material world is not part of God’s original creation 
and will therefore not be the final state...” (Decock 2011: 76). Thus, resurrection is a process 
of transformation which begins with baptism and finds its fulfilment at the end (Decock 2011: 
76). The end is imagined in terms of 1 Cor 15:28 (Deacock 2011: 76).  Kok illustrates how the 
Gospel of John’s resurrection and appearance narratives can serve as an empowering 
metaphor for existential living. He thus brings in chaos theory, New Testament Studies and 
Missiology in a creative, interdisciplinary dialogue with one another, to argue that in John 
10:17-18 the cross and the resurrection are inseparably bound together (Kok 2011: 130). 
 3.9 Pieter Craffert 
Pieter Craffert is a South African New Testament scholar based at the University of South 
Africa.  He joins the context group in terms of the social-scientific interpretive method on the 
resurrection and his writings are in the context of engaging other members of this group. 
Craffert traces social-scientific interpretation back to the context group thirty years ago. He 
asserts and correctly so that social-scientific interpretation was based on the insight that the 
Bible was written by, for and about people in the ancient Mediterranean world whose culture, 
worldview, social patterns and daily expectations differed sharply from those of the modern 
West (Craffert 2014: 1 & Du Rand 2005). Craffert therefore argues that “insights from the 
social and human sciences are utilized in order to identify and apply the social and cultural 
scripts of ancient Mediterranean life to biblical texts” (Craffert 2014: 3ff).  
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Craffert’s work engages that of Pilch (2004) who is arguably considered to be the father of 
social-scientific interpretation.  Craffert alludes to the work of Pilch on visions, heavenly 
journeys and other peak experiences in the biblical world (Craffert 2014: 3). He also draws 
attention to a recent example of a neurosurgeon Dr Eben Alexander who is said to have 
experienced a heavenly journey on the wings of a large butterfly. Craffert is of the opinion 
that Pilch lacks clarity in so far as what socio-scientific categories contribute to the 
interpretive task.  For Craffert, “It seems as if social-scientific interpretation fulfils two distinct 
functions in Pilch’s thought”. The one function which is to be understood against the 
background of existing New Testament research is to affirm the cultural plausibility of 
heavenly journeys. Social-scientific interpretation’s function is also to be seen against 
historical criticism’s inability to clearly identify the historical events that are at stake in the 
biblical reports of sky journeys. For Craffert, social-scientific criticism therefore functions as a 
supplement, if not a correction to such scholarship (the historical-critical scholarship). Social-
scientific interpretation in general and the study of alternative states of consciousness in 
particular function as a means to affirm the cultural plausibility of journey reports (Pilch in 
Craffert 2014: 7). Alternate states of consciousness will be fully discussed in the next chapter, 
suffice to say here that these states of consciousness deal with different levels of awareness. 
According to Craffert, social-scientific interpretation affirms the reality of the kind of 
experiences reported in the texts as similar to those of ACSs experiences reported in the 
second Testament. Cultural information interpreted by social-scientific methods strongly 
argued that these ASCs experienced did in fact really occur in the life of Jesus and his followers 
(Craffert 2011: 121). For Craffert this indeed settles the tendency to take such reports merely 
as literary creations or fictive reports. Once it is acknowledged that such reports can refer to 
real experiences, similar to those which people have in many different cultural settings, the 
question whether a particular report is an actual report about such an experience or a literary 
creation can simply be answered by looking at the reports (Craffert 2011: 121).   
It has to be admitted that in an interpretive setting where scholars are primarily concerned 
with the historicity or credibility of reported events (or their critical rejection/denial) it is 
indeed a step in the right direction to affirm the cultural plausibility of the reported events 
and phenomena by means of cross-cultural comparisons. In Pilch’s words “The actuality of 
such experiences in Mediterranean cultures thereby makes a social-scientific interpretation 
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of the Gospel tradition much more plausible than the results of literary and redactional 
studies uninformed by this kind of social-scientific research” (Pilch in Craffert 2011: 121). In 
this sense, social scientific interpretation provides hermeneutical clues as to what could be 
considered typicalities and regularities in the first-century Mediterranean cultural system 
(Pilch in Craffert 2011: 121).  
Craffert identifies a second function of Pilch’s social-scientific interpretation running 
throughout his publications. He suggests that Pilch sees social-scientific interpretation as a 
means of establishing the veridicality and actuality of reported events as opposed to seeing 
them as fictional stories. Pilch however, still wonders whether someone or part of someone 
really travels during such heavenly journeys.  This brings back the question of the ontology of 
resurrected bodies. To say an event is imaginal is to say it has no basis in outside reality (it is 
mind-created). In this understanding, something can only be real if it has some outside 
existence. In the context of Middle Eastern culture, the most plausible explanation of the 
report is that the disciples experienced the risen Jesus’ departure from them in an alternate 
state of consciousness (Craffert 2011: 171). 
The scientific ( anthropological) enterprise shows how experiences that are real for experients 
can also be seen as neurological phenomena while in this instance the fact that such 
experiences can be shown to really happen as neurological phenomena (they are real human 
experiences) is used to suggest that what is experienced is also real (Craffert 2011: 171). 
 It is statements like the above which that present problems. While Craffert develops very 
high conceptual vocabulary in articulating alternate states of consciousness it his inability to 
reach a decision on whether these are real or not that we find Craffert’s contributions 
problematic. He has correctly asserted that alternate states of consciousness in biblical 
narratives are plausible, but he fails to arrive at the conclusion that indeed alternative reality 
not amenable to scientific investigation exists. He can only go so far as to say, such 
experiences are real to the social actors involved. Craffert’s indecisiveness on whether what 
is experienced in alternate state of consciousness is real or imaginal is problematic. While this 
indecisiveness can be viewed as a regression in social-scientific scholarship it can be 
understood. Craffert’s definition of ‘reality’ as something with external existence inevitably 
leads him to the conclusion that what transpired in alternate states of consciousness is only 
42 
 
 
imaginal. The views of the present study are that progress will only be reached in social-
scientific study when scholars become able to unequivocally concede to the existence of 
another realm of reality that cannot necessarily be apprehended by the five senses. The Bible 
abounds with examples of perceptions that are outside the range of the five physical senses.   
Two of the clearest examples that presuppose an alternative realm of reality are the 
following: 
 And when the servant of the man of God was risen early and gone forth, behold a host 
compassed the city both with horses and chariots. And his servant said unto him, Alas, my 
master, how shall we do? And he answered, Fear not: for they that be with us are more 
than they that be with them (2 Kngs 6:15-18). 
 Again, an interesting experience is captured in the second book of Kings:  
But he went in and stood before his master. And Elisha said unto him, whence comest 
thou, Gehazi? And he said, Thy servant went no whither. And he said unto him, Went not 
mine heart with thee, when the man turned again from his chariot to meet thee? Is it a 
time to receive money, money and to receive garments, and olive yards and vineyards, 
and sheep and oxen and manservants and maidservants (2 Kngs 5:25-26)? 
 When Craffert therefore says ‘cross-cultural neuroscientific research is thus used to affirm 
not only the experiences but also the content of what is experienced’, this sounds like an 
unwarranted attack. Shouldn’t it be the objective of social-science interpretation to 
determine the reality or content of what is experienced in alternate states of consciousness?  
Regarding the resurrection appearances, the resurrection narratives claim that the disciples 
saw Jesus and that the risen Jesus could eat broiled fish in material reality. A cogent 
explanation of how this could have happened is provided by social-scientific criticism. Thus 
social-scientific interpretation functions for Pilch also to affirm the contents of what is seen 
in alternate reality (Pilch 2004). Craffert is of the view that determining the contents of trance 
experiences should be left to the field of parapsychology. The reason he shies away from a 
decision is probably because admitting that Jesus may have truly been raised from the dead 
entails a concomitant duty to then believe. This is the reverse of Licona who acknowledges 
that should it be proved that Jesus was not raised from the dead then there will be practical 
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implications. Could Craffert be shying from this issue because of what confirming the 
resurrection of Jesus could entail? This is for the reader to decide. 
What social-scientific methodology has been able to do is to show that at least orthodox 
events can be demonstrated to be plausible. Allison argues that “much about the historical 
Jesus will remain a mystery. Nothing is more mysterious than the stories of his resurrection”; 
“We know that after his death his followers experienced what they described as the 
resurrection: the appearance of a living but transformed person who died” (Allison 2005: 32). 
If use is made of the social-scientific interpretation, then the phenomenon of resurrection 
could at least be plausible. The import of all these observations is that Licona is unconvincing 
with his ‘New Historiographical Approach’. The subject under consideration is simply not 
amenable to any empirical/positivist historiography. Indeed, a new historiographical 
approach is needed but it is a social-scientific historiographical approach that is needed. 
 3.10 New Testament Historiography 
 It should be kept uppermost in mind that at the centre of this debate is the consideration of 
ways in which events removed from us in time, space, culture and thought could be 
understood. Licona may be right in surmising that biblical scholars fail to agree on the 
historicity of the resurrection of Jesus because they do not engage the historical question fully 
aware of the philosophical and methodological foundations of the task (Licona 2010: 19). But 
what are these philosophical and methodological foundations that Licona has in mind? Licona 
would be right if he were considering the essence of the resurrected beings or the ontology 
of the resurrected body referred to throughout the Gospel narratives and in 1 Cor 15. In his 
work on resurrection historiography Licona states that his aim is to “investigate the question 
of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection while providing unprecedented interaction with the 
literature of professional historians outside of the community of biblical scholars on both 
hermeneutical and methodological considerations” (Licona 2010: 20).  This interaction 
between biblical scholars and professional historian is according to Licona what is missing 
where secondary literature on the resurrection debate is concerned. It is this gap he claims 
to identify within current secondary literature on the resurrection discourses hence the 
intention to fill it (Licona 2010: 20). Again, a detailed discussion on Licona’s “New 
Historiographical Approach” has been discussed above, but an evaluation of Licona’s 
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presuppositions reveals that Licona is an example of New Testament scholars still trapped by 
modernist empiricism. 
What is clear from the foregoing is that valuable though Licona’s ‘historiographical approach’ 
may be for other purpose, it is inadequate to give sense to New Testament’s seemingly 
strange resurrection narratives. Craffert opines that historians need to understand that they 
“are grappling with the plurality of viewpoints and the multiplicity of reality systems that 
characterize the landscape of postmodern thinking” (Craffert: 2008: VX). Craffert observes 
that a major shift took place in later 20th century in secular historiographical discourse which 
is based on the acknowledgement of different forms of intellectual life as real and on the 
recognition that the strange and exotic in other historical eras can no longer be treated as the 
known and common (Craffert 2008: XV). 
 Craffert also maintains that traditional historiography and New Testament studies do not 
equip historical Jesus researchers to deal with the events or phenomena ascribed to the 
historical figure in a culturally sensitive way” (Craffert 2008: XV). Furthermore, despite 
variations and constant renewal in historical Jesus research, the historical Jesus research 
remains trapped in the framework of positivist historiography. Craffert, like his South African 
counterpart, Licona, advocates for a new perspective, a new historiographical framework and 
a new paradigm (Craffert 2008: XVI). Consequently, Craffert claims that his work on the life 
of Jesus of Nazareth represent the necessary shift in perspective.  Craffert’s prescription to 
the pitfalls and shortcomings of traditional historiography is what he terms ‘anthropological 
historiography’. In anthropological historiography, “it is accepted that because of the social 
and cultural construction of reality, human beings live in a world partly of their own making” 
(Craffert 2008: XV). The subtitle of this study is: ‘Insights from socio-scientific historiography’ 
and not ‘anthropological historiography’, is deliberate. There are two different socio-scientific 
orientations as will be shown.  
 3.11 Why Socio-Scientific Historiography 
The weaknesses of the three different methodological perspectives namely the literalist, 
illusory and the symbolic approaches can be distilled from the foregoing discussion. Luke 
makes it clear that it was not until the Day of Pentecost, some fifty days after the initial 
appearances had taken place, that any decisive and enduring psychological change seems to 
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have occurred in the first century Christians (Acts 2:1-40). It is therefore not resurrection per 
se that gives rise to the spreading of the teaching about the resurrection of Jesus. It is my 
thesis that though the methods before socio-scientific interpretation have been useful in 
other respects, they have hitherto failed to address the methodological, hermeneutical and 
epistemological issues germane to the investigation of the veridicality of the resurrection of 
Jesus. What seems to be needed is a “New Historiographical Approach”, to use the title of 
Licona’s work (Licona 2010). However, contrary to Licona’s prescriptions in his sophisticated 
confessional/apologetical historiography, the Social-Scientific Historiography is presented in 
this study as the alternative approach, perhaps the only approach able to unlock an 
understanding of the resurrection of Jesus in ways that we have not understood the 
resurrection narratives before. Social-scientific criticism will be found to be invaluable to the 
resurrection debate especially where the interpretation of resurrection visions is concerned. 
This is particularly so given the postmodern 21st century we find ourselves in.  In this light, Du 
Rand argues that in the postmodern era the emphasis is on contextuality, locality and plurality 
which have a bearing on the question of relativity (Du Rand 2005: 220). We cannot in the 
postmodern twenty-first century presuppose that reality is only limited to what is objective 
and can be apprehended by the senses.  
Du Rand is of the view that “reality is no longer a fixed arrangement of theological categories, 
but an ongoing, creative task in which perspectives and imagination play a crucial role (Du 
Rand 2005: 225). Du Rand attributes the church’s low energy in recent appearances to the 
fact that it makes concessions to the dominant epistemology (Du Rand 2005: 189). 
Fortunately, “modernity is displaced by postmodern imagination, which is less sure and less 
ambitious, and which more modestly makes its claim. One adage should remain true in this 
regard, namely that, “A reality exists independently of any individual apprehension of it”. 
Craffert echoes this sentiment when he maintains that the “the postmodern critique of 
traditional history has offered important correctives to historical thought and practice” 
(Craffert 2008: 89) 
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Chapter 4 
Interpreting Jesus’ Resurrection:  Social-Scientific Historiography 
4.1 Introduction  
Historiography, in general is the study of the methods of historians in developing history as 
an academic discipline, and by extension, anybody of historical work on a particular subject. 
The historiography of a specific topic covers how historians have studied that topic using 
particular sources, techniques, and theoretical approaches. 
  Craffert describes the social-scientific perspective as that approach informed by historical 
consciousness and the affirmation of multiple cultural realities (Craffert 2008). Malina as one 
of the pioneers of socio-scientific criticism sets the framework for understanding socio-
scientific interpretation in biblical studies (Malina 1996). A central assumption of Malina’s 
research is that meanings are derived from social systems and that present-day readers, in 
order to become considerate first-century readers, have to learn the scenarios of the 
documents’ original readers (Malina 1996: 79-81). Du Rand is of the view that there are at 
least three orientations within the social-scientific methodology. According to Du Rand, 
“some scholars in this approach define themselves as social historians, looking at their work 
as a continuation of traditional historical criticism of the Bible, the only difference being that 
they explore social aspects of biblical issues that have traditionally been analysed from a 
theological point of view” (Du Rand 2005: 183). Du Rand (2005: 183-184) continues that 
“others call their work social-scientific, arguing that they appropriate concepts and models 
from sociology and anthropology in an attempt to explain ancient Israelite and early Christian 
developments by use of these models”. Overholt argues that Anthropology helps to overcome 
the distance of time, geography and culture between the contemporary reader and the 
biblical world (Overholt 1996).  The biblical scholar as anthropologist, asks questions that 
authors and tradents of the biblical texts either took for granted or were not concerned to 
reflect upon, especially issues of social organisation and dynamics in which they were 
immersed (Overholt 1996).  
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 Yet still, others see their work in this field as cultural anthropology arguing that ethnography 
underlies their work on ancient Israel or early Christianity.  The first group is important 
because it ensures that the work on the resurrection done over the past two centuries does 
not only accumulate but it also becomes cumulative. It is important to recognize the value of 
earlier methods and then scaffold on them. The second two groups are important also to the 
extent that they bring to light aspects of social life not previously considered by traditional 
historical-critical methods.  This is particularly so as social-scientific interpretation broadly 
speaking, “aims at looking at the social dimension of biblical documents” (Du Rand 2005: 183-
184). Another aspect relevant for this study is the element of psychology in social-scientific 
criticism. The aim of psychological interpretation is to “describe and explain human 
experience and behaviour” (Du Rand 2005: 183-184).  
For Malina, “the goal of New Testament interpretation is to discover what some original group 
of first-century eastern Mediterranean understood when the documents now contained in 
the New Testament were read to them” (Malina 1996: XI).  Malina continues to say that 
“meaning, then and now, ultimately resides in the social system shared by persons who 
regularly interact with each other” (Malina 1996: XI). Malina (1996: xi) maintains that  
while the social dimensions of human behaviour have been a focused centre of concern 
early on in this century in departments of philosophy, history and/or ethics, it was largely 
around mid-20th century that disciplines such as sociology, cultural/social anthropology 
and social psychology reached a level of sophistication that allowed for and required 
academic independence from other university departments” (Malina 1996: xi).  Malina 
adds, “From the 1950s on, the proliferation of field studies and of cross-cultural data in 
the social sciences made it all the more obvious that biblical interpretation was, indeed a 
form of cross-cultural study. 
Thus, anthropology can enable the modern student to better interpret both the biblical texts 
and their cultural contexts (Overholt 1996). Overholt observes that data and theories from 
anthropology as part of the socio-scientific method can be useful additions to our repertoire 
of strategies for interpreting the resurrection of Jesus (Overholt 1996). Furthermore, Du Rand 
also argues that “the change of ideologies in the twentieth century challenges us to take 
notice, not only of the shift in the orientation of thought, but also an alteration of the 
framework within which thought takes place” (Du Rand 2005: 219).  
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Therefore, insights from the social and human sciences are utilised in order to identify and 
apply the social and cultural scripts of ancient Mediterranean life to biblical texts” (Craffert 
2014: 1). Furthermore, the social-scientific method has the advantage of being able to “assess 
the contours and degrees of the probable by attending to the regularities and typicalities of 
ancient Mediterranean life” (Elliot 1993: 91 cf. also Du Rand 2005). Craffert lauds Pilch for a 
“step in the right direction in affirming the cultural plausibility of the reported events and 
phenomena by means of cross-cultural comparisons” (Craffert 2014: 3).  
Having highlighted the above, it is important to draw attention to two further categories in 
socio-scientific criticism which have a bearing on whether we conclude that Jesus of Nazareth 
was raised from the dead or not. It is important to note that almost all socio-scientific 
interpreters look at the strange phenomena from the perspective of outsiders and strangers. 
They make no attempt to understand phenomena from the vantage point of participants. A 
typical example is Pieter Craffert who maintains that the reality of social actors involved in 
alternate states of consciousness is real to them. In fact, he cautions that the analysis of the 
actual contents of alternate states of consciousness is not the responsibility of the biblical 
scholar but that of those specializing in parapsychology (Craffert 2015). 
 Conversely, Pilch is of the view that while people are different culturally, at the same time all 
people are the same and can be part of the same physiological and neurological experience 
of ancient Mediterranean and comparable contemporary high context collectivist societies 
(Pilch 2004). A high context society is one in which members of that society interact on the 
basis of assumptions not always made explicit.  Referring to access to alternative reality Pilch 
makes the following observations. “The reason why this experience is so universal is because 
it is rooted in the basic physiological make up of every human being” (Pilch 2002). All human 
beings are 100% the same, 100% different and 50% the same and 50% different all at the 
same time. At the level of biology, all human beings are 100% the same (barring handicaps or 
the like) (Pilch 2004). The nervous system functions the same in all human beings no matter 
where they live or in what century. Of course, the country, culture, society, and family in 
which they live make them partly the same as other human beings and partly different, that 
is, 50 % the same and 50% different (Pilch 2004: 2). 
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 In his studies of the Sisala ritual, death divination practices of Ghana, Grindal is able to get an 
induction into the practices of the Sisala tribe so that he is able to appreciate the contents of 
the group’s alternate states of consciousness as a participant observer.  Otherwise, all other 
social-scientific interpreters remain outside the phenomena that they try to study. 
4.2 Altered/Alternate States of Consciousness 
An important concept in the socio-scientific study of resurrection is what is known as 
‘Altered/Alternate States of Consciousness.’ Cultural systems do not all follow the same 
methods of obtaining knowledge about the world. In some reality systems, a variety of 
experiences, which can be called alternate states of consciousness (ASCs) provide knowledge 
of what people take to be reliable information about the world (Malina & Pilch 2008:185). 
 Alternate reality describes that dimension of reality in which nonhuman personages such as 
spirits and/or the deity reside, and which human beings from culturally “normal” reality can 
sometimes visit in ecstatic trance by taking a journey (variously called “sky journey” or “soul 
loss” and the like) and to which people go when they die (Malina &Pilch 2008 :185) 
“Anthropologists studying cross-cultural psychology also  define  altered/alternate states of 
consciousness as conditions in which sensations, perceptions, cognition and emotions are 
altered” (Craffert 2008: 23). Craffert however has a problem with the term ‘altered’ and 
prefers ‘alternate’. 
  Craffert argues that, because the acronym ASC is commonly used in the literature for ‘altered 
states of consciousness’ it then presents a problem when it is applied to New Testament 
experiences. Craffert argues that “both the history of the term ‘altered’ (it was used to 
describe the states brought about by psychedelic drugs) and its implicit pejorative 
(ethnocentric) connotation discredits its continuous use” (Craffert 2008: 23). Craffert 
therefore at first seems to prefer ‘alternate’ because “different states of consciousness 
prevail at different times for different reasons and that no one state is considered standard” 
(Craffert 2008:23). Craffert argues that, “such states are characterized by changes in sensing, 
perceiving, thinking and feeling” (Craffert 2008: 23) “When a person is in such a state, the 
experience modifies the relation of the individual to the self, the body, one’s sense of identity, 
and the environment of time and space” (Craffert 2008: 23). However, while acknowledging 
the value of this insight Craffert also criticises it. While in one of his works Craffert (2008: 23) 
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seems to embrace the term ‘alternate’, he seems to suggest in yet another work that 
‘alternate’ is a misnomer. He argues that if both reality and consciousness are culturally 
constructed entities as argued above, neither of them is alternate but both are culturally real 
for the subjects. In other words, visions as one possible state of consciousness are not 
alternate in nature and do not give access to any alternate reality but are culturally approved 
states of normal consciousness within the framework of the consensus reality of the subjects 
(Craffert 2011: 22). 
Pilch, however uses the terms ‘altered’ and ‘alternate’ interchangeably. The view of this study 
is that Pilch is right because both terms capture a unique aspect of these states of 
consciousness. ‘Altered’ for example conveys the idea of change that the experient 
undergoes, therefore ‘altered’ captures the connotation of metamorphosis that the experient 
undergoes in ASCs. On the other hand, ‘alternate’ is also fundamental to the understanding 
of ASCs because it captures the idea of ‘otherness’ into which the experient goes. In other 
words, ‘alternate’ presupposes, and correctly so the idea that there is another realm of reality 
other than the ‘ordinary’ realm of reality. As a matter of fact, there are two broad realms of 
reality and the realm that we experience on a daily basis can be described as ‘normal’ or 
‘standard’. Culturally ‘normal’ or consensual reality is that aspect or dimension of reality of 
which a person is most commonly aware most of the time (Malina & Pilch 2008: 185). It is 
against this background therefore, that Pilch’s approach of using ‘altered’ and ‘alternate’ as 
interchangeable terms is going to be adopted.  Moreover, as Pilch indicates, one scholar has 
identified more than thirty such states of consciousness including dreams, visions, 
depersonalization and normal consciousness just to mention but a few. Therefore, the 
descriptor ‘alternate’ becomes very important to the understanding of alternate/altered 
states of consciousness.  
 Furthermore, in trance or in any other alternate state of consciousness, a person encounters, 
indeed enters another level or aspect of reality (Malina & Pilch 2008: 185). The experience of 
alternate reality is nonrational but not irrational, as claimed by those who do not believe 
these things. From the perspective of these latter persons, such experiences would be 
appropriately described as experiences of non-consensual reality (Malina & Pilch 2008:185).  
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Craffert maintains that “progress will only be registered once the spectrum of out of body 
phenomena is recognized and attention is paid to the neurocultural complexity of distinct 
instances of out of body experiences” (Craffert 2015: 13ff). Guijarro focuses on the 
Transfiguration story to illuminate the post resurrection appearances (Guijarro 2017: 395). 
He suggests that Jesus may have initiated his disciples to access alternate states of 
consciousness by means of visions they may have learned to re-enact (Guijarro 2017: 395).  
In the book of Acts, there is a countless series of episodes depicting alternate states of 
consciousness experiences: Acts 1:1-11 (ascension of the risen Jesus); 2:1-4 (descent of Spirit); 
2:5-13 (glossolalia) and many other instances cited by Malina and Pilch (Malina & Pilch 2008: 
185). The whole book of Revelations depends on the alternate state of consciousness 
experiences of the prophet John (Malina & Pilch 2008: 185). During the centuries before and 
after Luke, countless persons reported a range of visions and appearances involving celestial 
entities. Malina and Pilch argue that these experiences must be interpreted within the 
framework of their own culture’s consensus reality rather than ours (Malina & Pilch 
2008:185).  Paul ascribes his call by the God of Israel to undertake his change-agency task to 
an alternate state of consciousness experience initiated by God (Gal 1:1, 12). His descriptions 
of Jesus experiences, which he ascribes to God’s Spirit, are all instances of such alternate state 
events. Paul himself records his personal sky journey in which he experienced the ineffable, 
in “Paradise” (2 Cor 12:1-7).  Paul himself frequently receives directives from the realm of God 
(Rom 16:26; Gal 2:2; 2 Cor 12:8) (Malina & Pilch 2008: 185). 
Of course, Paul ascribes the visions of the resurrected Jesus to such alternate state of 
experiences (1 Cor 15:5-8). Aside from dreams and angelic appearances, the Synoptic Gospels 
report five main incidents of such visions and/appearances in the career of Jesus: two by Jesus 
at his baptism (Mark 1:9-11); and at his being tested as holy man (Mark 1:12-13), and three 
by various disciples : their vision of Jesus walking on the sea of Galilee (Mark 6:45-52); their 
vision of Jesus transformed (Mark 9:2); and finally the various resurrection appearances, 
including the final appearance of Jesus, in God’s name, commissioning the apostles to 
proclaim the gospel of God ( Craffert 2008: 186). Cross-cultural comparison suggests that the 
Gospel authors describe experiences of alternate states of awareness (Craffert 2008: 187). 
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Under the topic of alternate/altered states of consciousness, psychologists also talk of out of 
body experiences and near-death experiences. Very generally an OBE can be defined as an 
experience where you felt that your mind or awareness was separated from your physical 
body (Twenlow, Gabbard & Jones 1982: 450). This definition is echoed by Suzan Blackmore: 
“Out of body experiences are those in which the person seems to have left the body and to 
be looking at the world from a location outside it” (Blackmore 2005: 108). The term originated 
from parapsychology where it is used synonymously with expressions of occultism such as 
astral projection, ecsomatic experiences or exteriorisation of sensibility. In other worlds, it 
describes experiences by modern day people which are similar to heavenly journeys or soul 
flights in the ancient world. The experience of being out of one’s body can happen under 
numerous circumstances and represents a variety of discrete phenomena. It can be caused 
by illness or brain injury, it can be artificially induced by means of an electrical stimulation of 
the brain, by means of visual manipulation or ritual actions, it can result from sleep 
disturbances or occur during close encounters with death and bodily trauma, it can be 
induced by drugs or ideas and often occurs during extreme sport or sensory overload or 
deprivation and can even happen spontaneously. People who test high on the hypnosis scale 
can even be taught to experience OBEs at will (Craffert 2008: 185). 
Some of these conditions are pathological while others can be seen as psychological 
adaptations (Pilch 2004). This is important when considering how Jesus’s ontology in post 
resurrection appearances.  Not all instances contain an awareness of their own body at a 
distance from the self, some travels are in and others are out of the body. 
 The above observation is also important in so far as considering the bodies of those who 
claim to have witnessed Jesus’ resurrection are concerned.  OBEs related to severe trauma 
are probably the main source of complete accounts about such phenomena. There is a 
continuous and growing stream of OBEs related to the increase in resuscitated patients in 
intensive care units and subject to high care medical technologies (Pilch 2004). Even larger 
numbers of patients return from clinical near-death situations and a certain percentage of 
such patients claim to have had OBEs. What is clear is that OBEs are normal and natural 
potential of the human brain which under the right circumstances can be induced in 
everyone. In an out of body experience people feel that their self or centre of awareness is 
located outside of the physical body (Alvarado 2000: 183) One of the common features of 
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OBEs and NDEs is that experients regard such experiences as real, even more real than 
everyday reality and experiences and more than veridical. According to experients, these 
constitute ultimate reality. Again, this is where we need to ask whether alternate reality exists 
or not. As an experiential term OBE has been adopted or hijacked by several scientific 
disciplines including psychology, anthropology, religious studies and neurosciences to tame 
the above spectrum of instances. Even though the term OBEs is used for all the above 
instances, it is important to note that there are at least two distinct research traditions, one 
taking them as extra-corporeal events and the other as neurocultural experiences of extra-
corporeality (Pilch 2004: 16). 
4.3 Holy Man/Woman 
 Social-scientific interpreters of the Bible also recognize the concept of ‘a holy man’ in 
understanding resurrection narratives. A holy man is a person who has direct contact or 
communication with the realm of God by means of alternate states of consciousness (Pilch 
2004: 16-17). The activity of holy men usually is directed toward the benefit of people in their 
society. Such persons heal the sick, exorcise the possessed, and know what is going on in the 
unseen realm of spirits, demons and angels. In their encounter with spirits, holy men can 
interact with them without fear of being possessed. They can travel through the spirit/demon 
world, and they can readily make contact with the realm of God. Cultures that identify a holy 
man/woman (“shaman”) describe two characteristics: easy access to the realm of the deity 
and the ability to broker gifts (information, healing) from that realm to this world. There is 
sufficient information reported by Luke to rank Peter (Acts 3:1-11, 16; 5:1-11; 9:32-35) and 
Paul (Acts 9:3-19; 22:6-16; 26:12-18) among those as holy men (Pilch 2004: 16-17). Holy men 
remember their trance experiences. This is important because alternate states of 
consciousness are ways in which information is imparted to participants. 
 In Hellenism, such holy men were called divine men and were often given the title “son of a 
god.” The experience of Paul and Barnabas is evident (Acts 14:19b-20). In the two-volume 
work called Luke-Acts, the writer highlights the role of God’s spirit throughout the narrative. 
Spirit or wind is used as an analogy of the actions of humanlike unseen, unpredictable and 
powerful forces - the presence of which is experienced through effects on human beings. A 
spirit’s presence is known by unforeseen and unexpected effects. In Acts, the Holy Spirit 
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directs the activities in a sort of hands-on technique (Pilch 2004: 16ff see also John 3:8). 
Fieldwork reports will prove to be rich sources of comparative materials for helping us to 
understand specific phenomena, such as holy men who heal the sick and raise the dead. From 
this point of view, Pilch argues that the textual data on the visionary encounters are taken as 
evidence for the reality of Jesus’ resurrection as a cultural event but without claiming 
universal validity. Thus, it is suggested that a socio-scientific perspective offers an alternative 
framework for understanding the resurrection (Pilch 2004: 16). 
 4.4 Monophasic and Polyphasic Patterns 
  Where the resurrection of Jesus is concerned, Laughlin, McManus and d’Aquili identified 
what they call monophasic and polyphasic patterns (Laughlin, McManus & d’Aquili 1990: 18).  
A pattern of monophasic consciousness refers to the enculturation of people in Western 
cultures that give dominance to ego consciousness. Within such a culture “the only real 
experienced is that unfolding in the sensorium during ‘normal’ waking phase…and is thus the 
only phase appropriate to the accrual of information about self and the world.”  Most people 
accept and experience what is called polyphasic consciousness: many more states of 
consciousness (such as visions or dreams) are taken as real and are often experienced. Within 
each cultural system, beliefs and experiences confirm and support each other. Within a cycle 
of meaning people experience the entities they believe in and believe in the entities that they 
experience (Laughlin, McManus & d’Aquili 1990: 18). 
4.5 Historiography in the Context of Historical Consciousness 
This view of the world has far reaching implications for anthropologists and by extension for 
historians. One implication is that it is no longer possible to assume that everyone else is 
talking from, and about the same consensus reality. Therefore, some anthropologists adopt 
a position beyond the objectively there or the subjectively primitive position. First of all, it 
means an avoidance of the myth of realism- that is the belief that accounts or texts refer to 
realities in the or in our world. The interpreter’s deepest convictions and consensus reality 
can no longer be applied directly to all other people. It also acknowledges the past as not only 
a distant, but also an alien world. It is this position that recognizes that other people’s 
worldview and beliefs are different, that societies are different, that historical figures are 
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different, and that the past is not only a distant, but also a foreign world where people do 
things differently and those differences are respected. 
 Therefore, when evaluating documentary sources, “before anything else can be achieved, 
Craffert suggests that the historian must try to enter the mental world of those who created 
the sources” (Craffert 2009). Grasping their ultimate presuppositions implies a temporary 
moratorium on those of the interpreter. The activity of doing history is an activity designed 
to answer questions about a past that is constructed in terms of its pastness, and hence in 
terms of its difference from the present: historians of the brand sensitized by historical 
consciousness and multiple cultural realities face the challenge of a culturally alien past that 
they try to bring to light in a modern world. The challenge is to place texts, artefacts, events 
and persons in a world that is different from the world of the (Western) present. Therefore, 
where methodological assumptions are concerned, Craffert enumerates three insights he 
considers as characterizing the description of what has been called anthropological 
historiography. These are as follows:  
(1) The alien, strange and exotic can no longer be dismissed, but should receive serious 
attention. An acknowledgement of other forms of life and practices as real means that 
the “dark, contrasting, strange, even exotic events, manners and forms of life are 
drawn into the attention of history. Historians can no longer dismiss or absorb them 
but if their resources permit, have to account for them” (Craffert 2008: 185). 
(2) It is no longer obvious what the alien, strange, and exotic are all about. In fact, the 
historicity of alien and strange events and phenomena, Rusen (1993:178) says, ‘lies in 
their marrying the common sense criteria of historical interpretation. These insights 
have shattered the myth of realism that maintains the natural veracity of historical 
documents. Historians have realized that the “multiplicity and heterogeneity of the 
cultural creations of the human spirit allowed only for an incomplete historical 
interpretation from the perspective of a quasi-natural faculty of reason” (Rusen 1993: 
179). In anthropological historiography it is realized that the unique can be 
understood only in a social context, and that it requires an understanding of that 
context by means of theoretical constructs and comparative methods. One should not 
only know what the sources say, but also understand what they mean and assume, it 
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is necessary to do justice to the meaning, significance and context of the people 
involved. In other words, it is necessary to understand the conventions of discourse, 
the cultural dynamics, the social processes and the cultural assumptions that the 
subjects took for granted. 
(3) If not, only the past is there, but also an alien other, it is necessary to reflect on 
responsible ways and means of encountering that alien other. Historians have learned 
from anthropologists that people lead meaningful lives, and that those meanings can 
be discovered only within the context of those lives. Anthropological historiography, 
as a reaction against historiography trapped in ontological monism, is an attempt to 
reconstruct the significance of the social expressions that serve as its texts. Therefore, 
historians consult anthropological literature “not for prescriptions, but for 
suggestions, not for universal rules of human behaviour, but for relevant 
comparisons” (Craffert 2011: 22). 
Historians and anthropologists have a common subject matter, ‘otherness’; one field 
constructs and studies ‘otherness’ in space, the other in time. Both fields have a concern with 
text and context. Both aim, whatever else they do, at explicating the meaning of actions of 
people rooted in one time and place, to persons in another. Both forms of knowledge entail 
the act of translation (Craffert 2011: 23) 
The past is not only distant, but also an ‘other’, and this other is an alien ‘other’ that emerges 
in a dialogue between the historian and the past. Therefore, beyond the re/constructed past 
lies the dialogical past that emanates in more than one expression. What is expressed as 
reality and events by the subjects can often simultaneously be translated into different sets 
of conceptual terms. The gap between closeness and distance is bridged by a dialogical 
process containing cultural-specific as well as comparative language. The cultural alien past 
emerges from the dialogue between cultural-specific and comparative discourses and is 
presented in more than one version often containing a ‘yes’ and a ‘no’.  
Craffert suggests that the social-scientific interpretation understood in this way offers an 
alternative framework for understanding the resurrection accounts themselves as well as a 
diagnostic tool for analysing the scholarly debate regarding Jesus’ resurrection (Craffert 2011: 
14) 
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4.6 Jesus’ Resurrection as a Cultural Reality 
Craffert points out that if Jesus’ resurrection is viewed as a cultural reality, all the texts then 
should be taken as reports about a reality culturally conceived and containing entities 
culturally constructed. That means that the resurrected Jesus consisted of a culturally 
conceptualized body placed on the spectrum of first-century Israelite after-life options and 
based on knowledge-producing faculties that were legitimate to their world. In this view it 
would be possible to both affirm Jesus’ resurrection as a (cultural) reality for first century 
Mediterranean Israelite people while knowing perfectly well that the reports do not 
necessarily refer to events in time and space (Craffert 2011). 
4.7 The Human Body according to the Mediterranean Human 
There seems to have been at least two conceptions of the human body in ancient 
Mediterranean. On the one hand, whatever first century people believed about the human 
body, it never was the kind of body found in’ Grey’s Anatomy’ (Craffert 2008). Because, as 
Martin points out, within the conception of New Testament people, like that of their 
contemporaries, all things, including the variety of forms of life, were seen as various 
compounds of four basic elements, namely air (pneuma), earth, water and fire (Martin 
2002:32). Therefore, materiality consisted of a spectrum of more or fewer (or different 
configurations) of these elements and should not be seen in a dichotomy with nonmatter. 
Human beings, visible in whichever bodily format as souls, spirits or living beings, were 
configurations of these components and thus, in their terms, material and real. A resurrected 
body would have been neither a physical material body of the kind found in Grey’s Anatomy, 
nor a mutation  of such a body, it means Jesus would have been resurrected in a first century 
constituted body composed of the same stuff which made up bodies in their world and would 
have displayed the features ascribed to such bodies. 
 On the other hand, the Christian Bible seems to portray the human constitution as tripartite: 
“And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly; and I pray God your whole spirit, soul and 
body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ” (1 Thess 5:23). 
Pentecostal teachers teach that the body is world conscious, the soul self-conscious while the 
spirit is God conscious. It stands to reason therefore that anything that takes place within the 
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realm of God can be apprehended by the ‘spirit’. Within first century, people’s cultural cycle 
of meaning where belief and experiences worked together in constituting, confirming, and 
creating beliefs about the human body, a whole range of bodily experiences confirm their 
beliefs about the human body, while such beliefs in turn functioned as the basis for the bodily 
experiences. 
 Craffert discerns from the New Testament evidence that bodies could become possessed by 
alien evil spirits or demons (as in the exorcism stories in the Gospels), by benign spirits (the 
spirit of Jesus as in Paul’s letters), or by ancestral spirits (as in the question whether Jesus and 
John the Baptist actually were revived prophets of the old) (Craffert 2008). In a number of 
texts (see e.g. Mark 8:27-28 par., John 1:19-21) both Jesus and John the Baptist are 
questioned about their identity which suggests the belief that ordinary human beings could 
be possessed by deceased ancestors. The bodies of first century ancestors (like those of many 
others living in polyphasic cultures), could experience trips into heavenly spheres as referred 
to by Paul in 2 Corinthians 12. Such heavenly journeys or soul trips are common to shamanic 
figures. Furthermore, a host of ancient texts indicate that humans could after death be turned 
into angels or astral beings. Craffert maintains that these all belong to the astronomical 
complex that is the physics and physiology of the day that insisted that the stars, souls and 
angels were of the same substance (Craffert 2008). He cites Moses and Enoch as the best-
known figures in the Israelite tradition that turned into astral beings. In some Israelite circles, 
Moses was seen as a divine being, while 1 Enoch (104) assures the righteous that one day 
they will also shine like the lights of heaven- an idea also expressed in Daniel 12:3. 
Any resurrected body would have belonged to this spectrum of bodily conceptions. Besides 
the ingredients provided by first-century Mediterranean people’s culture, images of Jesus’ 
resurrected body would have been constituted by means of the culturally recognized faculties 
of the day, such as visions and visionary appearances. Craffert observes that these people 
lived in a polyphasic world where dreams, visions, revelations and other bodily experiences 
such as heaven-travel experiences were fairly common and were taken as knowledge-
providing experiences (Craffert 2008). Such experiences, while today often described as 
altered states of consciousness (ASCs), were for them normal or ordinary, though often 
exceptional, states of consciousness. Consciousness or ‘the normal state of consciousness’ in 
any given culture is a cultural construct and not a given, and therefore in any society ‘a finite 
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set of possible phases of consciousness is declared normal’. The result is that what is 
experienced as normal or ordinary consciousness is a ‘construction’, not a given, and a 
specialized construction that in many ways is quite arbitrary. The Gospels ‘death and 
resurrection narratives are full of visionary experiences and figures encountered in these 
visions which seem to perfectly fit the logic in Paul’s answer about the reality of Jesus’ 
resurrection: for him and his audience visionary appearances arguably constituted legitimate 
and sufficient evidence for Jesus’ resurrection.  
In these texts, at least twelve people or groups of people are credited with ‘having seen Jesus’ 
or of having ‘had visions of Jesus’ (1 Cor 15). Craffert uses his knowledge of the realm of the 
UFO and Marian apparitions as models for comparisons and he says the following: ‘Group 
sightings are not uncommon in the realm of UFO or Marian apparitions, and therefore there 
is no reason to doubt that 500 brothers at a time could have seen Jesus. Paul’s visionary 
experience is discussed extensively in Acts (9, 14 & 22) and is confirmed by his own testimony 
(Gal 1:12), while both reports about the women clearly refer to visionary encounters (John 
20:11 and Matt 28:2). In fact, in both cases the women are reported to also have seen angels 
in these visions. There is no reason to think that seeing Jesus was any different from seeing 
the angels. Jesus’ appearance to Cleopas in the Emmaus story also demonstrates remarkable 
aspects of the seeing because apart from the fact that Jesus suddenly appears, he was not 
immediately recognized (Luke 24:13-35).  
The three other reports are about various appearances to the eleven disciples, the last one 
being the appearance in Galilee. Craffert finds diction in the resurrection narratives to be very 
instructive.  He points out that in John (21:1) it is explicitly stated that Jesus revealed himself, 
while Matthew mentions that it was on a mountain- a setting conducive to visionary 
experiences (Craffert 2010). Craffert observes that in the other two reports about the 
visionary appearance in Jerusalem the disciples were seeing him but again did not recognize 
him (Luke 24:36.) It may be added that in Matthew’s account of Jesus’ death, a number of 
saints (in a vision?) emerged from their tombs (Matt 27:52-53).  
In these people’s world, visions were legitimate ways of obtaining knowledge: they were 
neither objective seeing nor hallucinatory in nature but were culturally real. Despite opposing 
conclusions about the resurrection sightings, scholars on both sides of the debate take visions 
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as merely psychological phenomena or hallucinations. It is widely acknowledged that visions, 
in particular in the context of grief and guilt, are experienced by people of many cultures, and 
that the content of visions is dictated by culture. Also, there is a remarkable consensus that 
such visions are merely psychological processes and are most often referred to as 
hallucinations (Blanke & Mohr 2005: 184).  
Some critical scholars argue that the historicity of the resurrection cannot simply depend on 
hallucinations while conservative scholars are of the same opinion namely, that visions are 
merely hallucinations. Wright  for example argues that visions or such sightings were ‘well 
enough known in the ancient world’ but would have been classified as hallucinations thus, 
delusions, for he maintains that ‘the ancient world as well as the modern knew the difference 
between visions and things that happen in the real ‘world’ (Wright 2003). 
4.8 Visions as Hallucinations 
 From the foregoing, the literalist view, the illusory view and the symbolic views have been 
unpacked, so to speak. While the three different orientations present quite cogent 
explanations to support their theories. it is clear that these theories carry with them fatal 
flaws. Orthodox scholars fail to appreciate the fact that the ‘body’ that Jesus had was not the 
normal human body. Any view that post resurrection sightings were in time and space are 
untenable in the light of resurrection narratives. As has been discussed in the foregoing, 
liberal scholars look at Jesus’ resurrection visions in terms of hallucinations. Hallucinations 
are a sign of pathology, but as contemporary research has continued to show, while there are 
similarities between visions and hallucinations, normal, healthy people claim to see visions. 
Seeing things not necessarily objectively out there is no longer considered a mark of 
pathology. The third view of resurrection looks at resurrection as metaphor for the revival 
and rejuvenation of Israel as a nation and therefore, should be seen as symbolic. This view 
fails to see that resurrection, at least in Maccabees is unequivocally individual and bodily. 
Pilch, quite correctly points out that support for the vision as-delusion view is culturally 
insensitive (ethnocentric) and ‘entirely inappropriate for the ancient Mediterranean world’, 
because it does not ‘present the modern, Western reader with information about reality as 
the ‘natives’ knew and experienced it. This view departs from the Western medicocentric 
construction of such phenomena as merely hallucinations and pathological delusions- a 
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position no longer tenable in the world of historical consciousness. ‘These altered states of 
consciousness allow a person to glimpse dimensions of alternate reality either not usually 
available in ordinary consciousness, or in the case of Western cultures deliberately blocked 
from the total potential of human consciousness (Pilch 2004). 
Craffert explores the idea of polyphasic cultures in so far as visions are concerned. Within 
polyphasic cultures, reality and consciousness are constructed differently from monophasic 
cultures and although distinctions are still made between visions and hallucinations it is not 
the same distinction. Modern neurological and cognitive research explains why the above 
could be the case. It is because brain scans show that visual and visionary perceptions register 
in exactly the same way in the human brain. It is culture that teaches some people that 
visionary, dream and revelatory experiences are or are not to be trusted as knowledge-
creating experiences. Social-scientific interpreters believe that for subjects in polyphasic 
cultures such experiences could very well have served as a basis for a firm belief that Jesus 
was bodily raised from the dead. These accounts are linked not only to their spectrum of 
beliefs about the human body and their visionary ways of knowing about it, but also to their 
spectrum of afterlife beliefs and the way in which such beliefs were parasitic on ASC 
experiences. It is perhaps no coincidence that ever since the idea of bodily resurrection was 
expressed in Israelite religious documents in Daniel 12, two components of their cultural 
system (visionary or revelatory experiences supplemented by a cultural notion about the 
human body) were in alliance in producing and maintaining the idea. From a social scientific 
perspective, it is suggested that afterlife beliefs connected to cultural notions about the 
human body came together in certain experiences that resulted in the origin of belief in Jesus’ 
resurrection. 
4.9 The Case for Objectivity 
 Socio-scientific interpretation will also inevitably have implications on the nature of reality 
itself. The idea of an ‘objective’ resurrection is something that has increasingly come under 
serious scrutiny in recent years. Social scientific scholarship has argued that to talk about 
‘objectivity’ in historical Jesus research as something out there and amenable to empirical 
historiography is to miss the point altogether. They would rather use ‘reality’ as the more 
acceptable term. A fundamental question in such a discourse is a question of what constitutes 
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reality. It is clear from cultural observations that reality has many dimensions beyond that of 
which human beings are routinely aware (Pilch 2004: 17). 1 Cor 15:3-8 which many scholars 
consider to be the earliest source on the resurrection does not specify the nature of the post-
resurrection appearances. Indeed, Paul seems to have envisaged resurrection to have been 
somewhat ‘bodily, ’yet he still insinuates that this kind of body would not be gross physical 
body (1 Cor 15:44). Firstly, Jesus can appear one moment and the next moment vanish 
seemingly into thin air. The resurrected Jesus can go through locked doors. Even though the 
body of Jesus may have been material enough for him to eat fish and to cause Thomas to put 
his fingers into the prints of Jesus’ wounds, yet it was a body that could move into locked 
spaces, appear and disappear (John 21:12ff; Luke 24:31). 
 In response to the Sadducees’ question on possible post-resurrection marriages, Jesus makes 
it clear that the resurrected beings would not be getting married because they would be like 
angels (Luke 20:36). In other words, resurrection translates one into an angel and transfers 
them into the realm of God. Paul also speaks about glorified bodies after resurrection, also 
insisting that “flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God” (1 Cor 15). From a critical 
realist perspective, it is accepted that there also exists a reality totally independent from any 
human representations (Craffert 2008: 29). Searle adds that the argument that different 
presentations are different demarcations or constructions presupposes external reality 
(Searle 1995: 166). Smith identifies two contrasting strands of tradition in the first century 
church concerning the form of Jesus’ resurrection: 1) Jesus’ bodily resurrection was a spiritual 
one, which might have been translated directly to heaven after his death, rather in the 
manner of some Old Testament worthies (Gen 5:24, 2 Kgs 2:11) and 2). That his body retained 
its original physical nature, albeit with some unusual features (Luke24: 16, 31, 36-37, John 
20:14, 19, 26, 21:4) (Smith 2019: 54). For Smith, “both alternatives presuppose some kind of 
objective presence: either the disciples experienced an objective vision indicating the real 
presence of Jesus or that he stood there before them in the flesh” (Smith 2019: 54). The world 
is populated by groups of people who live in divergent consensus realities. How the world is, 
or what reality is like, is partly subject dependent. According to this view, reality is not out 
there simply to be discovered, but is partly created by the subjects. What human beings take 
as reality is partly the product of their own making. Within each cultural system or consensus 
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reality there exist many objects or things called intentional objects that are real, but not 
necessarily objective (Pilch 2004).   
People in the Ancient Mediterranean world did not need historical or scientific evidence that 
Jesus could have been resurrected, because visionary experiences coupled with the 
potentialities of the human body were sufficient. In this perspective, there are not some 
cultural and some real elements in the resurrection accounts. For example, eating fish in a 
visionary encounter (John 21:9-14) constitutes no evidence that it must have been either a 
real breakfast on the beach or that Jesus’ body was anything other than a culturally 
constituted body. And in a world where visionary perceptions are as real as other sensory 
perceptions, there is no doubt that what is seen, heard and felt in the visions are as real as 
what is experienced in waking consciousness. Therefore, touching the resurrected Jesus 
provides evidence of a first-century material body being touched, because the touching takes 
place either in visionary experiences, or of a body that could appear and disappear, move 
through closed doors or a sealed tomb. If Jesus did appear to so many people and continued 
a material bodily existence after death as reported by the visions, it was obvious to them that 
the tomb must have been empty.  
Culturally constituted data do not necessarily provide evidence for universally valid claims 
about the world out there. Although people firmly believed that what they experienced was 
in fact happening in the world out there, a cultural-sensitive approach allows us to place such 
claims in a comparative perspective. People living in a differently constructed cultural reality 
need no longer accept such reports as objective reality. Craffert argues that, just as witches, 
demons or spirits can be real but not objective, that is also the case here (Craffert 2004). In 
this interpretation of the data, it is perfectly correct to say that when understood as a cultural 
reality the angels appeared as physical beings and Jesus indeed rose bodily from the dead as 
constituted by first century people. Craffert continues, [a]t the same time, when confronted 
with a claim about events in the world that arguably comes [sic] from culturally shaped data 
and reports, it is necessary to also adopt a dialogical and critical perspective” (Craffert 2009: 
34)  
From such a viewpoint, Jesus’s resurrection was not necessarily an objective event in time 
and space. Two answers could thus be given regarding whether Jesus rose bodily from the 
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dead. Craffert answers, ‘yes’ and ‘no’. Yes, these were real cultural events and realities, yes, 
Jesus’ resurrection was a genuine cultural experience for his first followers and yes, he was 
resurrected, as the texts indicate, in a first-century conceptualized material body. Since these 
people lived by a different logic and consensus reality it was neither mere delusion nor 
objectively real, but culturally real. In this view Jesus was resurrected in a body of transformed 
physicality’, in a glorious body’ or in ‘an immortal, powerful, glorious, spirit-directed body’ 
but in a culturally conceptualized body. No, culturally constructed intentional objects and 
phenomena are not necessarily objectively real. Jesus’ resurrection as a first century culturally 
experienced event was in this view not an event in time and space. 
 Again, even if the term ‘bodily’ were retained, the term ‘bodily’ here has a special meaning. 
‘Bodily’ is not necessarily nor exclusively a function of biology, as social-scientific interpreters 
are quick to caution.  In relation to the facticity of New Testament narratives, Prickett 
observes that “…in secular literature, chronicle and even history, the boundaries between 
“fact” and “fiction” were not those that a modern audience would necessarily take for 
granted. The Latin word historia covered both “history” and “story” in our modern sense”. 
Prickett continues, “It is worth remembering that the origin of the word ‘fact’ lies not in any 
notion of objectivity but in the Latin factum: “a thing done or performed” (Prickett 1996: 45). 
Therefore “to apply the notions of fact or fiction to Acts would be anachronistic” (Pilch 2004: 
7).  
4.10 Taking the Scholarly Debate beyond the Ethnocentric Dualisms 
The social-scientific perspective offers not only an alternative framework for understanding 
the resurrection accounts but also diagnostic tools for analysing the scholarly debate. From 
this perspective the most remarkable feature about this debate is that because ontological 
monism and the myth of realism pervade the current debate, the nuances needed to deal 
with multiple cultural realities are missing (Craffert 2008: 180ff).  Craffert suggests that just 
as anthropologists had to revise their picture of the nature of the world, New Testament 
scholars are challenged to come to grips with multiple cultural realities and divergent 
rationalities. According to Craffert, a social-scientific interpretation perceived in this way 
requires a suspension of the rationalist approach which appropriates the texts as if people 
were talking about events in our world, or even about our consensus reality.  
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Craffert observes three more implications for the current debate which may be mentioned: 
(1) The on-going dispute in historical Jesus research as to whether the resurrection 
accounts should be taken literally (or metaphorically) should be abandoned. Both 
the claims that statements about Jesus’ resurrection can no longer be taken 
‘literally’ or that they have ‘lost their literal meaning’, as well as apologies that the 
first followers of Jesus all took resurrection language as being literal, concrete and 
real, have lost their meaning in the world of multiple cultural realities. If the ideas 
of a common reality or a universal human consciousness are problematic, it goes 
without saying that any claim of a literal understanding of the resurrection is based 
on such assumptions would become nonsensical (2014: 386). 
(2) A social-scientific perspective places worldview back in the centre of historical 
interpretation. Allison concludes his analysis of studies on Jesus’ resurrection with 
the remark that ‘people’s arguments regarding the origins of Christianity are 
unavoidably driven by large assumptions about the nature of the world’ that did 
not grow out of the study of the material but come as articles of faith that inform 
their research from the beginning (Allison 2005) Consequently, he maintains, 
historians cannot say anything definitively about the resurrection, one way or the 
other. Historical consciousness as a filter in anthropological and historical research 
forms part of the fundamental assumptions about the nature of the world, and 
consequently part of every anthropological or historical investigation. Historical 
investigation does not take place in the absence of worldview but in terms of world 
view. The view of the world consisting of many different worldviews suggests that 
worldviews are always present in historical interpretation and historiography. The 
acknowledgement of multiple cultural realities demands a cross-cultural and 
comparative dialogical process in which differences can be negotiated. A culturally 
sensitive reading of the New Testament data suggests that visionary encounters 
were (for them) adequate and sufficient for claiming Jesus’ resurrection from the 
dead- and such a claim can only be made in view of multiple cultural realities 
(Craffert 2014: 386)  
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(3)  Social-scientific interpretation claims to be a culturally sensitive reading of the 
data, parallel to the ethnocentric readings of modern scholarship, offers an 
alternative interpretation of the very same texts. In other words, like any other 
interpretation it is claiming to say what the New Testament reports are about. 
While acknowledging the New Testament claims regarding the cultural reality of 
Jesus’ resurrection a whole new debate is waiting to be explored (Craffert 2008: 
181) 
 Craffert provides an alternative framework for understanding the New Testament data by 
means of three insights (Craffert 2011: 1ff). First, a neuroanthropological perspective is 
offered which undermines our natural way of looking at vision and by supporting a picture on 
polyphasic cultures within the world of multiple cultural realities. Secondly, it provides a 
framework for appreciating visionary experiences as potential source for creating cultural 
realities and considers people’s consensus realities as legitimate expression of what is real (to 
them). In this way an alternative framework is offered for understanding the data about 
Jesus’s visionary experiences (Craffert 2011: 2)  Thirdly, an anthropological study on death 
divination among the Sisala clan of Ghana is offered as cross-cultural parallel for appreciating 
the role of alternate states of consciousness (ASCs) experiences in creating and maintaining 
consensual reality within polyphasic cultures. It is argued that for nearly two thousand years 
belief in Jesus’s resurrection was maintained and transmitted like other cultural beliefs as the 
consensual reality of Christianity that needs no historical or scientific justification,  the origin 
of resurrection belief is to be found in the visionary experiences of Jesus’ first followers and 
in a neuroanthropological  perspective these are not hallucinations but can be seen as 
culturally approved visual perceptions that were knowledge  and reality constituting events. 
 The fact that critical scholars deny any such event does not remove the fact that they also 
read the texts as if that is what they are about- only to reject the claim. In his article on an 
experiment in neuroanthropology, Craffert suggests that the same data can be interpreted 
differently.  The neuroanthropological suggestion is that it never was about a physical event 
in time-space that could be seen objectively but about a culturally approved experience that 
constituted consensual reality for those involved (Craffert 2011: 22). Therefore, instead of the 
debate being whether the texts talk about a physical event in time-space that could be seen 
or not (and that can be accepted or rejected on historical grounds), it suggests that the 
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question should be what kind of event the data is evidence for. Craffert suggests   that the 
historian’s choice is not between fact or fiction but how to deal with the historicity of cultural 
realities (Craffert 2011: 22) 
4.11 A Neuroanthropological Perspective 
Neuroanthropology is one of the emerging interdisciplinary fields of research for the study of 
the culture-brain nexus. It seeks to investigate the fact that human experiences, discourse 
and actions are at the same time culturally, genetically, neurologically and environmentally 
constrained and constructed. Together with cultural neuroscience it operates in and 
investigates the interrelationships between culture, mind and brain but from a particular 
anthropological perspective (Craffert 2011: 22). Cultural neuroscience is itself an emerging 
field that focuses on the bidirectional interaction between cultural experience and the brain. 
These studies are interested in the complex relationships among body, brain and 
environment. The term neurosciences itself is a catch-all term for the revolution which is 
taking place in fields differently known as transpersonal sciences, cognitive psychology, cross-
cultural psychology and the biological neurosciences. Transpersonal sciences (in Psychology 
and Anthropology) refer to the movement in anthropological research which acknowledges 
as data the significance of experiences beyond the boundaries of ego consciousness (Laughlin, 
McManus, and d’Aquili 1990: 18) A neuroanthropological perspective provides a language to 
discuss what is encountered in the texts as complex human phenomena, the means to 
understand and compare them with related phenomena and the tools to explain what is 
observed. This method seeks to explore what the data as culturally and neurologically 
produced expressions are evidence for and how such data can best be interpreted in the 
present world.  
Craffert follows two strategies in arguing the case: first an explanation of what a 
neuroanthropology perspective reveals about the world of vision is given, supplemented by 
an anthropological case study on the raising of the dead. These insights are then be applied 
to the NT data on Jesus’ appearances. 
The neurosciences are constantly changing our working model of the world by showing ‘that 
three separate realities intermingle to give us a working model of the world: the reality that 
actually exists outside of the brain, and two internal realities-maps that our brain constructs 
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about the world (Newberg and Waldman 2009: 7). At the heart of the anthropological project 
is a particular appreciation for the central role that culture plays in human affairs (see 
Dominguez, Turner, Lewis et al. 2010: 38). Together as neuroanthropology the focus is on 
how cultural values, practices and beliefs are shaped by the mind, brain and genes in a bi-
directional way to create a model of the world (Chiao 2010: 110). In its widest sense reality 
consists of material objects in the world as well as intentional objects or beliefs. Natural 
languages are full of things that cannot be seen, but that are real (Dennett 2006: 210-217). 
They are subject and culture dependent things and include things such as marriage, money, 
and theft, but also ghosts, demons, spirits and gods. Another feature of the world model is 
that for all people the ‘object world . . . is subject dependent (Shweder 1986: 191).  
Craffert contends that what is even more complex about our versions of reality or our working 
models of the world (for all people) is that they are negotiated agreements containing specific 
elements, are produced in a particular way and have very characteristic features. They are 
negotiated as configurations of the world out there, sensual constraints, brain maps and 
cultural features, put differently, they are given by the world out there, are constructed by 
the brain, they are limited by perceptual apparatus and the constraints of our senses, and are 
guarded by what society and culture agree on. One’s sense of reality depends on three 
criteria: the subjective vividness of an experience, the continuity and duration of the 
experience through time and space, and the consensus of others on what is considered real 
(Newberg & Waldman 2006: 278).  
Following from this, neuroanthropology embraces the acknowledgement that the planet, as 
confirmed by anthropological record, is populated by multiple models of the world or cultural 
realities and that polyphasic cultures constitute one of the options. Most people on the planet 
accept and experience what is called polyphasic consciousness: many more states of 
consciousness (such as dreams or visions) are taken as real, and often constitute the content 
of experiences. Anthropology makes us aware that those settings are equally real for different 
cultures and groups and therefore people live in differently constructed worldviews and 
conceptions of reality.  
Local people need little defence or explanation of what their reality is like because it is 
confirmed by tradition and experienced in the cycle of meaning of everyday life. People live 
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in diverse cultural realities. Beliefs and experiences work together to confirm reality and 
maintain traditional and cultural beliefs. Within a world that acknowledges multiple cultural 
realities it does not make sense to argue against the actuality of people’s consensual reality 
for they are all equally real.  
Therefore, determining what happened (experienced events) or writing history in a world 
occupied by multiple cultural realities poses unique challenges. One of the challenges of 
historiography is coming to terms with actors living in such culturally defined systems. 
Historians, like anthropologists, realise that such phenomena can no longer be evaluated by 
means of the standard criteria and understanding of the Western scholar and therefore, have 
to find ways of writing histories that take the native’s experience of reality seriously (see, e.g. 
Rusen 1993:178-9) The strange and even bizarre can no longer be either dismissed as mere 
superstition or incorporated into the world-view and reality system of the Western historian 
(Craffert 2009: 132-139).  
The most significant insight highlighted by the revolution in the neurosciences is clearly 
expressed by Newberg and Waldman when pointing     out that ‘what is amazing about our 
perceptual process is not how accurate it is, but how real it makes the world appear” 
(Newberg & Waldman in Craffert 2006: 62). For this reason, very few people on the planet 
questions (sic) the actuality of their own working model of the world (worldview) or 
experiences. It takes radical reflexivity to question (even to see) the subject dependence of 
one’s own objectlike consensual reality (Craffert 2006: 62). However, if ethnocentrism is to 
be avoided, cultural realities are to be respected in their own right but without endorsing 
each and every one of them. The recognition of different worldviews and alternate notions 
of how the world works leads to a process of discussion and dialogue in which in difference 
are respected by recognising their uniqueness while similarities are explored by means of 
analytical and comparative frameworks.  
Engaged fallibilistic pluralism is the term used to describe a complex act of interpretation 
whereby idiosyncratic and local understandings of the world are engaged in a process of 
mutual recognition, criticism as well as self-criticism. It was coined by the philosopher Richard 
Bernstein (1991: 336) in order to acknowledge the existence of multiple cultural realities with 
divergent rationalities that ask for cross-cultural dialogue while maintaining the position of 
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cultural critique. However, it is not only the shape of the world that is being altered by a 
neuroanthopological perspective but also our understanding of how it is constructed. The 
reason for the nature of this interpretive engagement is that most anthropologists have 
moved beyond the interpretive landscape provided by nineteenth and early twentieth 
century positivism. Shweder points out that anthropologists who regularly encounter alien 
forms of life and unfamiliar modes of thinking have at least three basic choices of how to 
present them. At the risk of being ridiculed and dismissed by colleagues they can take them 
all for real or, they can dismiss such alien beliefs and practices as deluded, wrong, confused, 
irrational, misinformed, superstition or mythical (Shweder 1986: 171-172). There are several 
reasons in favour of an interpretive stance that takes reality as relative to one’s consciousness 
of it. 
4.12 Vision and Conscious Reality in Neuroanthropological Perspective 
One of the areas of remarkable agreement in studies on Jesus’ resurrection is on the 
understanding of the post-mortem appearances or the seeing of Jesus as reported in several 
texts. The shared interpretive framework for understanding these accounts is much more 
remarkable than the disagreements among scholars: it maintains that seeing refers either to 
objective visual perception or to hallucinations (also referred to as subjective visions). For 
critical scholars hallucinations are illusions or delusions and therefore a baseless ground for 
securing the resurrection. While Goulder quite correctly shows that Jesus’ post-mortem 
appearances can be seen as visionary experiences, he views such experiences as 
hallucinations and delusions and thus inadequate as evidence for Jesus’ resurrection. 
(Goulder 1996: 47-55) Therefore, he concludes that the resurrection of Jesus did not in fact 
take place.  
Some critical scholars, however, accept that hallucinations could account for the earliest 
belief that Jesus was bodily resurrected (Crossly 2005: 75) This is the case where the term 
hallucination is used not in a pejorative sense but simply as a ‘construct of the human mind 
without corresponding external reality’ (Crossley 2005: 174 n10) For conservative scholars 
visions as hallucinations would certainly not be sufficient to ground the historicity of the 
resurrection and therefore, the visionary accounts in the gospels must have been akin to 
normal seeing. While many apologists acknowledge the existence of visions, they are treated 
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as either hallucinations or subjective visions and by definition unable to account for the belief 
in Jesus’ resurrection (Allison 2005: 278-284). 
The secondary literature on Jesus’ resurrection is preoccupied with a distinction between 
vision (seeing) and visions (hallucinations). When looking at neuroanthropological research it 
is clear that three interconnected (fallacious) assumptions characterise these positions, 
namely the natural understanding of vision, the notion that visions are merely hallucinations, 
and thirdly, a (Western) common sense dichotomy between vision and hallucination. The two 
most important insights to be illustrated here are that the simple dichotomy between seeing 
(vision) and hallucination (visions) do not hold in neuroanthropological perspective (Craffert 
2008: 181ff). 
4.13 Beyond our Natural Way of Thinking about Vision 
For most people on the planet, visionary perception is the primary sense for obtaining and 
constructing knowledge about the world. For that reason, “seeing is believing” is taken almost 
for granted. Our natural (at least, Western) way of thinking about vision contains two truisms: 
if you claim to have seen something, it must have been out there (unless you are ill or 
deluded) and if you have seen something it must exist objectively. According to this view 
‘information comes into the eyes and is processed by the brain; this leads to our consciously 
seeing a picture of the world which we can act upon. In other words, we must consciously see 
something before we can act on it (Blackmore 2005: 28-29). Or in Ramachandran’s 
explanation, this view assumes that ‘ there is an image inside your eyeball, the optical image, 
exciting photoreceptors on your retina and then that image is transmitted faithfully along a 
cable called the optic nerve and displayed on a screen called the visual cortex’ (Ramachandran 
2004: 24). 
This perspective of socio-scientific criticism asserts that in numerous ways prior beliefs 
and convictions determine what we see and what we do not see. “The understanding 
and interpretation of a vision derives from the culture, more specifically from what 
anthropologists call culture’s latent discourse or traditions of the culture” (Goodman 
1973: 101). In the biblical world the discourse is basically the Israelite tradition that 
believed that God’s communication with human beings in altered states of 
consciousness was normal (Pilch 2004: 5). Therefore, perception is culturally dependent. 
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Whenever we look at something, the perceptual component of belief, Newberg and 
Waldman argue, operates in the background of our awareness: ‘Since there is always 
too much information to take in and process, the brain identifies what it believes to be 
significant and ignores or censors the rest’ (Newberg & Waldman 2006: 63). In fact, 
perceptions of reality and beliefs are inextricably intertwined (Newberg, et al 2006: 278). 
Biologically and neurophysiologically, a belief can be defined as any perception, 
cognition, or emotion that the brain assumes, consciously or unconsciously, to be true 
… I will use the term ‘perception’ to refer to the information we receive about ourselves 
and the world through our senses.  
Cognition, however, represents a different level of processing within the brain, and 
includes all the abstract conceptual processes that our brain uses to organize and 
make sense of perceptions. Finally, every persons’ belief system is influenced by 
the input he or she receives from other members of the community, for if we do 
not experience adequate social consensus, many of our most cherished beliefs 
would never emerge into consciousness (Newberg, et al.2006:21-22) 
These examples show that not even external reality is presented by the perceptual processes 
in its naked truth. But visual consciousness is not dependent on external reality only. 
4.14 Visual Perception without External Stimuli 
 Newberg and Waldman say the following concerning about perception in general. “Besides 
from external stimuli, visual consciousness can also result from other sources or settings: 
artificial electrical stimulation, by means of alternate states of consciousness (ASCs), stress or 
trauma or result from psychotic illnesses or brain injuries. In other words, people can 
experience exactly the same visual consciousness through any of these sources (Newberg & 
Waldman 2006:63). 
4.15 Hallucinations: Illusionary Sense Perception from Injury or Illness   
A hallucination is a false sensory perception in the absence of an actual external stimulus and 
contains the notion of pathology (Craffert 2008, Pilch 2004). Furthermore, the neurobiological 
potential for ASCs can produce mystical or religious experiences that follow similar pathways 
as hallucinations associated, for example, with schizophrenia but with significant differences. 
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Psychiatric patients experiencing hallucinations often have persisting distress and a poor 
quality of life (Bentall 2000: 91) while such experiences in a religious context can be very 
enriching and meaningful (Newberg, et al. 2009: 107-113). 
While both mystical states or other culturally approved ASCs and psychotic states are 
characterised by apparent hallucinations, delusions and other strange behaviour, it does not 
mean they have the same status. There are more good reasons why visions are not necessarily 
pathological or hallucinations. As Goodman says: ‘In hallucination the content of what is 
reported is something to which nothing real corresponds, it is a delusion (Goodman 1987: 
282.) But there are many instances of similar phenomena (such as visions) that are neither 
pathological nor experienced as deviation or illness. For this reason, within polyphasic settings 
visions are not hallucinations but culturally approved states of consciousness. As Goodman 
argues: “we need to take a stand against those psychiatrists who clinically equate vision with 
hallucination” (Goodman1973: 82). That applies well to so-called critical NT scholarship. 
Socio-scientific interpreters argue therefore that ultimately it is not the brain itself that can 
determine the reality of a visual perception- it is the intersubjective validation of a community 
that is the final arbiter of consensual reality. Visual perception in itself is not guarantee that 
something exists outside of the brain because as shown above, such perceptions are all similar 
to the brain. It is culture that teaches some people that visionary, dream and revelatory 
experiences are or are not to be trusted as knowledge-creating experiences and allowed to 
contribute to knowledge about the world. Visual perception is as much dependent on what is 
out there as what happens in the brain and what is intersubjectively approved (Goodman 
1973: 82). 
Within a neuroanthropological perspective the neurophysiological potential for perceptual 
experiences (visionary, auditory, tactile and the like) in the absence of external stimuli is no 
longer equated with pathology but recognised as culturally approved means of constructing 
consciousness. Socio-scientific interpreters maintain that ultimately it is not the brain itself 
that can determine the reality of a visual perception-it is the intersubjective validation of a 
community that is the final arbiter of reality. This viewpoint also has implications for insider 
participants who either do not know or do not care that what they report are visionary 
experiences. Today the neurosciences show why one would not know because neurologically 
speaking these are similar phenomena while anthropological studies illustrate that culture 
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and society justify and approve a vision as legitimate and true. The brain itself cannot make a 
distinction regarding the source of visual perceptions. For the brain all visual perceptions are 
equally real and valid and within polyphasic cultures normal and natural.  
The NT itself contains ample evidence that from the narrations themselves, and one can 
deduce, in the minds of the authors and audience in polyphasic cultures, no distinction needs 
to be made between an event taking place in real time-space and those taking place as visions. 
This is apparent in the baptism stories, the transfiguration narratives and visitation by angels 
in the birth narratives. When placed within the larger narrative world of the Jesus movement 
it is clear that right from the start at Jesus’ baptism up to the early phases in the life of the 
early church, visionary experiences, revelations and dreams played a significant role in their 
everyday encounters. Within the consensual reality of polyphasic people, visionary 
encounters constitute a major source of knowledge and basis for reality. Visionary perception 
was equally real and valid for obtaining knowledge. The point to be taken is that in such 
cultures and by such actors no distinction is necessarily made in narratives about events out 
there and events experienced in ASCs.  
Grindal’s experience of participating in death divination did not happen out of the blue but 
resulted from induction to Sisala culture and was accompanied by very specific local 
circumstances. Grindal claims to have neither eaten nor slept properly in the days preceding 
the night of the night of the ceremony (Grindal 1983: 61).  Grindal could enter the consensual 
reality of the Sisala through a long process of on-site learning. This would be akin to the 
initiation in classical civilizations. It would appear as if what finally gave the followers of Jesus 
the courage to speak boldly of Jesus’ resurrection was not the ‘resurrection appearances’ in 
isolation, as the orthodox scholars would have us believe.  What gave the conviction of the 
resurrection of Jesus to not only the disciples of Jesus but to subsequent generations of 
believers seems to be the advent of the Holy Spirit in Acts 2:1ff). The Holy Spirit then made 
the resurrection real to the first disciples and subsequent converts. The reception of the Holy 
Spirit with its concomitant glossolalia is clearly behind the boldness and the conviction of the 
disciples. As a matter of fact, Jesus is on record as telling his disciples not to depart from 
Jerusalem until the advent of the Spirit. “And behold I send the promise of my Father upon 
you: but tarry ye in the city of Jerusalem until ye be endued with power from on high” (Acts 
24:49). “But ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you and ye shall 
75 
 
 
be witnesses unto me both in Jerusalem and in all Judea and in Samaria and unto the 
uttermost part of the earth (Acts 1:8). As has been alluded to, there hasn’t been any 
satisfactory theory to account for the exponential growth of the Christian faith together with 
fearless preaching by the apostles especially in the first century. The farewell discourses 
however are very clear about how Christianity would grow. Would be Christians would never 
need to be convinced about the reality of resurrection. The conviction would come about 
through the agency of the Holy Spirit. “And when he is coming, he will reprove the world of 
sin, and of righteousness and of judgement. But when the Comforter is coming, whom I will 
send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, which proceedeth from the Father, 
he shall testify of me” (John 16:8, 15:26). And this is why this gift is not just for the apostles 
alive at the advent of the Holy Spirit: “For the promise is unto you and to your children and 
to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall call” (Acts 2:39). 
The canons of empirical research limit reality to that which is verifiable through the 
consensual validation of rational observers. An understanding of death divination must 
depart from these canons and assume that reality is relative to one’s consciousness of it. Thus, 
to understand death divination, one must know and be a part of the naturally and culturally 
constructed events which create the experience (Grindal 1983: 76). As a partly 
autobiographical presentation this is a remarkable illustration of a historical interpretation 
informed by neuroanthropological perspective of foreign or alien beliefs, practices and 
experiences. Within what he describes as a synesthetic integration of his senses there is no 
distinction between ‘events’ that took place in time-space and those that were in his 
interpretation ASCs.  
In the case of social actors who do not possess the analytical and comparative language of 
ASCs, what they perceived is what has happened (subjectivity is objectlike. Noteworthy for 
our present purpose is also what is absent from the analysis. The dead man is just seen roused 
and beating the drum. There is no speculation about the kind of body the drummer occupied, 
it is not asked whether he really played the drums or about how many witnesses really saw 
him playing and whether Grindal and some of the locals who saw the event were merely 
deluded by means of hallucinations. The ‘resurrection of the drummer is not the ‘fact’ to be 
affirmed or rejected by means of the scholarly analysis but a local interpretation of the data 
to be understood and dealt with. Grindal does it by acknowledging its status as consensual 
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reality while as an anthropologist at the same time characterising it as an ASC produced by 
the synesthetic integration of his senses. From a neuroanthropological point of view, there is 
no distinction (within such an experience) between sensory perception and visual 
consciousness. The reality created by the experience is a mind culture unity that is affirmed 
or rejected by society. It is clear that similar experiences of perception can be created by a 
variety of external or internal stimuli. 
Round about 30 CE on his way to Damascus to violently persecute the believers, Jesus 
appeared to Saul of Tarsus (see GaI 1:13-14, Phil 3:6). However, he was not the only or first 
Israelite or person to have seen Jesus after his death because some three years earlier a 
number of Jesus’s disciples made the same claim and he arguably knew about it. While not a 
single text claims that any of the first followers have witnessed Jesus’ resurrection, all the 
available evidence suggests that his first followers were fully convinced about it because they 
saw Jesus or appeared to them. At least twelve individuals or groups of people are credited 
in the canonical texts with having seen Jesus’, or, of ‘having had visions of Jesus’. In addition 
to his own visionary experiences , Paul mentions in 1 Corinthians 15 appearances to Cephas 
(v.5) and James (v.6), the twelve (v.5) and the apostles (v.7) and to five hundred brothers (v.6) 
When defending Jesus’ resurrection in 1 Corinthians 15, Paul is convinced about it because of 
these (visionary) experiences.  
While there are also accounts of an empty tomb, it is no great insight to say that the empty 
tomb accounts are not sufficient evidence to evoke belief in a resurrection (Smith 2019: 55). 
Data in the Gospels themselves confirm (see e.g. Matt 27:64, 28:13, and John 20:13) that an 
empty tomb itself is not good evidence for a resurrection because a body could have been 
stolen or removed (Smith 2019: 55).  
4.16 Belief Based on Visionary Experiences 
The circle of first followers of Jesus, and at least Paul, believed in the literal, bodily 
resurrection of Jesus because they saw him. In addition to the above-mentioned evidence, 
there are both Pauls’ own and Luke’s accounts (Acts 9:14 & 22) of his visionary experience. 
What Luke offers as Paul’s co-called conversion experience on the road to Damascus, can 
equally well be described in anthropological and neuroscientific terms as ecstatic trance or 
an altered state of consciousness (Pilch 2004: 25-40). It is clear that for Paul this as well as the 
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resurrection appearances to the other disciples were not normal events of visual perception 
but visions or revelations in which God revealed his Son- deduced from the passive verb 
ofethey used four times in 1 Corinthians 15. In 1 Corinthians 9:1 he affirms that he has orawo 
Jesus while in Galatians 1:12 he calls his vision a revelation (apocalypsis).  
Paul probably was fully convinced about what he saw (as Grindal was) but without the 
interpretive language of consensual reality and ASCs. But the meaning is not merely in the 
single words. It is apparent that Paul and the gospel authors talk about the same events by 
means of distinct styles. In the Gospels the resurrection appearances are presented by means 
of third person narratives and as witnessed accounts. As indicated above, within polyphasic 
cultures there is nothing strange about presenting a visionary experience as if it is a witnessed 
event. Paul, on the other hand, lists or reports about the events (1 Cor 15) and from a 
neuroanthropological perspective it is obvious that for him and his audience visionary 
appearances constituted legitimate and sufficient evidence for Jesus’ resurrection.  
The narrative accounts in the Gospels of what Paul calls visionary appearances (visions) by 
Jesus’ followers, contain both direct and indirect evidence about their nature. While certainly 
not part of the earliest manuscript tradition, the longer ending of Mark (due to text critical 
considerations) contains summary reports of appearances to three distinct groups- 
accidentally these are also the people mentioned in the other narrative reports. It is 
remarkable that the text repeatedly states (Mark 16:9,12,14) that these were appearances or 
revelations. The first are the visionary experiences of the women. While it is impossible to 
reconcile the data if these were reports about actual vision events, what remains constant is 
that some women had visionary encounters of Jesus (John 20:11 and Matt 28:2). In fact, in 
both cases side by side to having seen Jesus, the women are reported to also have seen angels 
(or in the Lucan version (Luke 24:4), two men in dazzling apparel. When referring to the 
women’s experience, Luke explicitly says that they saw ‘a vision of angels’ (24:23). There is no 
reason to think that seeing Jesus was any different from seeing the angels. And at least the 
vision of angels is another instance in the NT of narrative account that in a normal way relays 
about a visionary experience.   
Second, it is possible that the Markan reference to the two disciples walking into the country 
(Mark 16:12) is a reference to the Lucan story about the Emmaus account that is clearly 
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presented as a visionary encounter. Jesus’s appearance to Cleopas in the Emmaus story also 
demonstrates remarkable aspects of the seeing because apart from the fact that Jesus 
suddenly appears, he was not immediately recognised and appeared and disappeared 
randomly (Luke 24:13-35). According to the Markan (16:2) account, he appeared to them in 
‘another form’ – a feature associated with visionary experiences (Pilch 1998: 58, Craffert 
2002: 101).  
The third group is the appearance to the disciples. In the Gospels three different locations are 
mentioned for the appearances: Jerusalem (John 20:19-23) somewhere between Jerusalem 
and Emmaus (Luke 24:13-35) and Galilee (Luke 24: 36-49 par, John 2:1). These engagements 
with Jesus all contain elements typical of visionary encounters, such as, a lack of immediate 
recognition of his face or his ability to travel (in the visions) through closed doors or thin air. 
The Gospels all contain and agree on the fact that Jesus appeared to his first followers while 
John (21:1) explicitly states that Jesus revealed himself. Matthew (28:16) mentions that it was 
on a mountain – a setting conducive to visionary experiences. In fact, Matthew’s account of 
visionary experiences started already at the time of Jesus’ death when a number of saints 
emerged (in a vision) from their tombs (Matt 27:52-53). 
Where visionary experiences give access to consensual reality, the content of the visions are 
not only as real and true as those obtained from ordinary perception but also true to life. 
What is experienced in reality constituting visionary events becomes real and true. In visions, 
like in dreams, people can perform almost any action. Pilch (1998: 57), for example refers to 
research that ‘the subject having the vision or dream provides the soundtrack for what is 
being seen. Dream provides the soundtrack for what is being seen.’ And the soundtrack 
derives from the culture’s latent discourse or lexicon. For these reasons the resurrected Jesus 
could move through closed doors, and disappear randomly, eat and speak. It is hardly a 
revolutionary insight to claim that most scholars agree that Jesus’ first followers, including 
Paul, believed he was resurrected because they saw him or because he was revealed to them 
(Pilch 2004: 17ff)  
The suggestion from a neuroanthropological point of view is that precisely as visions they 
were reality creating events and for them constituted the basis for the belief that Jesus was 
resurrected from the dead. As a cultural reality it was subjectively (culturally) constituted but 
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like all other realities appeared and presented objectlike. Therefore, read from this culturally 
sensitive point of view a new appreciation for the NT data can be developed that do not take 
the texts at face value as about the normal seeing of a physical resurrected body. And, as with 
the Sisala case, these are not accounts of visions (of angels and Jesus) scattered in between 
accounts of real events or true seeing encounters. The real exegetical challenge remains to 
analyse Paul’s accounts as well as the Gospel narratives about the appearances as accounts 
of synesthetic integration or ASCs that constituted reality for them. 
4.17 Belief in a Resurrected Jesus 
But visionary experiences were not the basis for belief in Jesus’ resurrection for everybody in 
the Jesus movement and definitely not for the majority of Christian believers ever since. In 
fact, already in Paul’s letters (but also elsewhere in the NT) there is ample evidence that many 
people believed in Jesus’ resurrection based on the preaching of the gospel. Paul in his first 
letter to the Corinthians says: “For I delivered to you as of first importance what I also 
received’ (15:3) and part of what is transmitted is that Jesus was raised from the dead. Or, as 
he says in verse 11: ‘so we proclaim (preach) and so you believed”.  
Allison believes that resurrection proclamation became part of and consequently obtained 
the status of culturally transmitted knowledge among Jesus’ first followers and subsequent 
generations. For almost two thousand years the Church’s belief and confession contained the 
notion of Jesus’ bodily resurrection from the dead and that was transmitted through 
preaching and teaching. Ever since the second generation of Jesus followers it probably was 
the case that very few (if anybody) came to the belief in Jesus’ resurrection based on 
evidence, proof or experience and like all other cultural realities, people believe and live by 
the beliefs of their culture or subculture, be that spirits, ancestors, death divination or a 
resurrected Jesus (Allison 2005: 352). In other words, over the centuries Christians did not 
believe in a literal bodily resurrection because it has been proven but because it was believed. 
Similarly, the majority of Christians today are (and were) probably ignorant of any, if not most 
of the historical or so-called scientific arguments allegedly supporting Jesus’ resurrection. 
Allison is probably correct when saying that most people believing in Jesus’ resurrection do 
not base it on historical or scientific proof (Allison 2005: 352). Although ignorance should not 
be the mother of devotion, true religion involves realms of human experience and conviction 
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that cannot depend or be undone by critical scholarship. It is neither scholarship nor scientific 
reasoning that provides the basis for the resurrection belief of the church. By the same token, 
few people will stop believing in the resurrection of Jesus based on scientific or historical 
arguments because people cannot be argued out of something they have not been argued 
into. People do not believe Jesus’ resurrection to be real because it is historical, but they 
believe it is historical because it is real to them. In this sense Jesus’ resurrection is beyond 
historical proof, not because, it was a ‘divine act’ but because it is a belief or consensual reality 
(Craffert 2008: 181).  
 Resurrection scholars distinguish between two stages of resurrection belief, namely the 
origin of the belief and its transmission. From a neuroanthropological perspective it is 
apparent that the visionary origin of belief in Jesus’ resurrection is different from the cultural 
process whereby it was transmitted as a consensual reality. However, socio-scientific are of 
the view that such a consensual reality can historically be analysed, and its impact can be 
interpreted but it cannot be proven, historically or otherwise. Craffert concurs with this 
observation because he himself beliefs that while visionary experiences can be seen as real, 
it is the contents thereof that remain outside the purview of biblical scholars (Craffert 2008: 
181). As will continue to be highlighted, Pilch has a different take, maintaining that the human 
physiology and nervous system can be trained to enter into the experiences of ASC 
participants. There are rituals by which the posture that is conducive for ASCs can be assumed 
(Pilch 2004: 17). Like the Sisal death divination, the visionary experiences of a resurrected 
Jesus did not just happen to anybody at no particular place. Behind the entire textual 
accounts, one is to postulate a first-century Mediterranean cultural reality constituted by 
means of visionary experiences situated within a polyphasic culture and informed by afterlife 
beliefs and the physics of the day about human bodies and beings. The process of entering 
these consensual realities can however be learnt. 
 It bears repeating here that the New Testament conception of the human constitution as a 
tripartite being is crucial to the understanding of visions without external stimuli. When 
attentive to the presence of various ASCs, it is remarkable how many episodes in the Gospels 
can be seen as reports about such experiences. Fairly obvious are the accounts of Jesus’ 
baptism and consequent spirit experiences.  
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Furthermore, the first element of this pattern is the astronomical complex which refers to the 
whole set of ideas that divine beings, celestial bodies and deceased ancestors were composed 
of the same substance and that some human beings can be turned into celestial bodies or 
angels (Craffert 2008: 193-196). This is hardly surprising as the writer of John asserts that God 
is a spirit (John 4:24) then going back to Genesis, the Deuteronomic historians says that the 
first human was created in the image of God (Gen 1:26). Even creation narratives portray God 
pouring into the first human something of himself, namely his own spirit (Gen 2:7).  
The second element is afterlife notions. Among notions of astral transformation and sleeping 
with the ancestors, resurrection from the dead developed in Second Temple Judaism as one 
pathway for the Israelite deceased. In other words, at the time it became an acceptable 
cultural conception for life after death (or the afterlife) (Craffert 2008: 174). Thirdly, such 
experiences are closely related to cultural notions about the human body. (Craffert 2008: 174-
177, 187-196). Without particular notions about human beings and the human body, afterlife 
ideas cannot exist. A dualist notion of the human self is essential for these beliefs. The idea 
that the self can exist independently from the body is a prerequisite for any kind of afterlife 
existence and therefore, in the Israelite tradition (as in many others) afterlife beliefs are 
closely connected to a variety of ASC experiences. Out of body experiences (OBEs) such as 
travelling experiences, visionary experiences of deceased ancestors (seeing or encountering 
the deceased) as well as near-death experiences (NDEs) are all connected to notions of the 
afterlife and historically linked to the development of such ideas (Craffert 2008: 174ff).  
These visionary or revelatory experiences were supplemented by a cultural notion about the 
potentialities of afterlife options of the human body. While the idea of an individual 
resurrection before the end of time was a novel idea, it was something ascribed to a very 
important social personage. Jesus is presented as a figure who on all accounts started his 
public life based on an ASC experience and who, according to the reports, together with his 
followers have often experienced ASCs. On the best of evidence, he saw himself, referred to 
himself and probably was venerated by his followers as a son of man- a term closely 
associated with people who have experienced heavenly journeys (Craffert 2008: 309-352). 
Claims of a bodily resurrection did not happen to any human being at that time. 
82 
 
 
 A neuroanthropological perspective alters the interpretive framework within which the data 
about resurrection appearances are situated in at least two ways. By undermining our natural 
way of looking at vision and by supporting a picture on polyphasic cultures within the world 
of multiple cultural realities. In that way it provides a framework for appreciating visionary 
experiences as potential source for creating a cultural reality. While psychologically powerful 
for individuals and epistemologically significant for communities in providing knowledge 
about the world, such experiences and events are, within this perspective, also placed in a 
comparative setting where the neurological, personal and social dimensions are understood 
as commonly human (as ASCs) and culturally constructed.  
Within the cycle of meaning of polyphasic cultures, visions indeed contribute to creating 
consensual reality. And since reality for all human beings is a negotiated construct of 
mind/brain, culture and environment, it is arguably also the case with those members of the 
human race who are convinced about death divination and bodily resurrections. As for 
Grindal and Paul and the first disciples such visionary (synesthetic) experiences could very 
well have served as basis for a firm belief in death divination or that Jesus was raised bodily 
from the dead. This neuroanthropological perspective on Jesus’ resurrection, therefore, 
escapes the current debate fixated on fact or fiction. Like Grindal who as an anthropologist 
has appreciation for the cultural view and consensual reality of the Sisala people, the cultural 
reality of Jesus’ resurrection can be endorsed without claiming it happened in time-space. 
Like death divination among the Sisala we can and should respect their cultural reality for 
what it was, but it is not necessary to elevate it to an objective event. According to this 
interpretation, Jesus was literally, bodily and physically resurrected according to the logic and 
beliefs of the time. He was bodily and physically resurrected in a truly first- century Israelite 
culturally conceptualised body based on experiences and beliefs appropriate to them.   
 Based on the visionary Jesus’ bodily resurrection was real, at least for the first disciples and 
Paul, and this reality has been transmitted as belief and confession in the Jesus movement. 
This analysis by socio-scientific interpreters is brilliant. Be that as it may, if our work has to be 
meaningful and applicable to Christian praxis, a determination has to be made whether 
indeed Jesus was raised from the dead or not. Pilch is the only social-scientific interpreter 
who has made an attempt to analyse the contents of ASC experiences especially where the 
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resurrection of Jesus is concerned. Pilch has gone further to lay down ways in which ASC can 
be induced. 
4.18 The Socio-scientific Perspective: A Critique 
From the foregoing, it is not difficult to appreciate how invaluable the socio-scientific 
historiography is to the historical Jesus quest. What is made abundantly clear from a 
historical-critical perspective is that our reason and our senses are after all the sole fountains 
of our knowledge. However, it has also been made abundantly clear that there is more to 
reality than what meets the eye. “By faith he (Moses) forsook Egypt not fearing the wrath of 
the king: for he endured, as seeing him who is invisible” (Heb 11: 27) (emphasis mine). The 
future for socio-scientific histography will have to deal with phenomena in the ‘realm of God 
or what African Traditional Religions call the ‘living dead’. 
Many socio-scientific interpreters labour under a misapprehension that ‘seeing’ into the 
alternate realm was not only common but pervasive in ancient Mediterranean. This 
misapprehension is further extended to argue that in more than 90 percent of the cultures, 
this phenomenon is common and prevalent. Nothing can be further from the truth. As a 
matter of fact, the text of the New Testament is couched in the language of classical 
civilizations. Words such as ‘mystery’, ‘hidden’ and so forth abound in Pauline literature. 
These words communicate the idea that such phenomena were hidden to the average person. 
In a sense knowledge obtained through alternate states of consciousness could actually be 
described as esoteric, hence the need for those participating in ancient rituals to be initiated. 
This observation is also borne out by the remark by the author of first Samuel that ‘…in those 
days the word of the Lord was rare and there were not many visions.’ (1 Sam 3:1). To get his 
servant into alternative reality, Elisha had to pray, ‘Open his eyes that he may see.’ (2 Kgs 
6:17). 
 Furthermore, when the disciples saw Jesus in his post resurrection form, they worshipped 
him but some doubted (emphasis mine) (Matt 28:17). Another case in point is when the 
disciples see Jesus walking on the see and then remark, ‘what manner of man is this? 
(emphasis mine). Such observations are important to highlight the fact that though the 
phenomenon of beings inhabiting alternate reality are portrayed as easily traversing 
‘ordinary’ reality, such observation needs to be qualified so that those who are incredulous 
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of the experiences can also be understood.  While Mediterranean believers are more likely to 
interpret an altered state of consciousness experience as an encounter with someone from 
the realm of God, while a scientifically sophisticated Western believer may be inclined to 
interpret such an experience as a ‘hallucination’, that is something pathological by studying 
comparative societies psychological adaptive methods, we can learn how to visit the 
alternative realm (Pilch 2004: 3). In the biblical world the latent discourse is basically the 
Israelite tradition that believed that God’s communication with human beings in altered 
states of consciousness was normal” (Pilch 2004: 5). Pilch (2004: 8) says further that  
the Bible in general and Acts in particular nowhere present the reader with a complete 
report containing all the elements and/or stages of a trance experience as they are known 
today from anthropology and cognitive neuroscience. The Bible is a high context 
document that is its authors assumed the original audience would be able to supply 
details that are not explicitly mentioned. 
 Socio-scientific methods can help us to reconstruct ancient Mediterranean presuppositions 
where altered states of consciousness are concerned. “Trance experiences which are one of 
the many levels of awareness available to human beings can be spontaneous or induced” Pilch 
2004:8). Intentionally induced trance ordinarily occurs in the context of a rite (Pilch 2004: 8). 
Examples of rites are prayer (Acts 2:1-4, 13:2) sensory deprivation through fasting etc. (Pilch 
2004: 9). “The sacred authors agree that after his crucifixion and burial, Jesus was seen ‘alive’ 
(see Luke 24:5, 23, Acts 1:3) by different people on more than one occasion and this as has 
been shown took place in altered states of consciousness. These people truly saw the risen 
Jesus in altered states of consciousness experiences. These people, then, are ‘witnesses’ of 
his being raised from the dead” (Pilch 2004: 14). In his lifetime, Jesus was considered a ‘holy 
man’ (Mark 1:24 Holy One of God’).  A holy man is “characterized by an ability to have ready 
and direct access to God and the realm of God, and to broker power and favours from that 
realm to human beings” (Pilch 2004: 16-17). Alternate or non-ordinary reality includes those 
aspects or dimension of reality of which persons are most commonly aware most of the time” 
(Pilch 2004: 17). Alternate or non-ordinary reality includes those dimensions of reality in 
which God and the spirits are to be found” (Pilch 2004: 17). “Social scientists call behaviour 
dealing with social line crossing a ‘rite’. Since an ASC experience deals with moving across the 
metaphorical boundary separating the dimension of normal reality from alternate reality, 
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such transition entails a rite” (Pilch 2004: 171). The ancients a priori believed that the seen 
and the unseen realms interacted with each other: “Do not forget to show hospitality to 
strangers, for by so doing some people have shown hospitality to angels without knowing it” 
(Heb 13: 2, Gen 18: 1). Pilch makes it clear that for 90% of the population of the world, the 
common consensus reality embraces both ordinary and non-ordinary reality: “Ordinary 
reality and alternate reality exist simultaneously and are part and parcel of normal experience 
available to the common awareness of all members of the society”. Human beings live in 
ordinary reality and move definitively to alternate reality at death. Yet it is possible to visit 
alternate reality from ordinary reality in trance journeys also called ‘spirit soul’ by 
anthropologist. Conversely, those who live in alternate reality (God, spirits, beloved departed) 
can and do visit ordinary, reality too. (Pilch 2004: 18).  Research has discovered that cultures 
identify a passageway between ordinary and alternate reality. It is a hole or opening or a crack 
or door between the earth and the sky that the visionary must find and pass through in order 
to travel to alternate reality (Pilch 2004:18). Contemporary trance research and experience 
recognizes that the opening is not necessarily a geographical location as it more a question of 
tuning the body that exists in ordinary reality to the frequency of alternate reality (Goodman 
1990: 180-181). Only with this “special preparation of the physical self is the visionary able to 
properly perceive alternate reality” (Pilch 2004: 19). Research indicates that this preparation 
can be learned. It may be part of the general cultural expectations as in the ancient 
Mediterranean world, or it can be learned as in the modern western world (Pilch 2004: 19). 
 As a holy man during his lifetime, Jesus obviously possessed the ability to perceive alternate 
reality, the realm of God (Pilch 2004: 19). Now after his resurrection, Jesus is ready to return 
to the realm of God in a way in which he has been accustomed to associating with the Father 
during his lifetime, namely through ecstatic trance e.g. Luke 3:21-22 (Guijarro 2017). The 
disciples who as the Gospels indicate are also capable of such experiences (e.g. Luke 9:28-36) 
witness the event (Acts 1:9-10) (Pilch 2004: 20). Two men also appear at Jesus ascension and 
they are identified as angels-beings from alternate reality, the realm of God (Pilch 2004: 20). 
These are clear markers of alternate states of consciousness in which Jesus is apprehended 
(Pilch 2004: 20). “The apostles experienced Jesus’ return to the realm of God in an altered 
state of consciousness experience. The Apostles became emboldened to preach their fuller 
understanding of Jesus, an understanding gained in their altered states of consciousness 
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experiences” (Pilch 2004: 22). From their study of the human brain and nervous system, 
cognitive neuroscientists have concluded that God has incredibly hard-wired the human body 
for altered states of consciousness experiences (Pilch 2004:22). Our ancestors in faith did not 
distinguish between natural and supernatural. That distinction first emerged with Origen in 
the third century CE. Prior to Origen, the realm of God together with all other disembodied 
beings was part of the total environment in which human beings lived. This was the totality 
of reality. There was unrestricted interaction between the Spirit world and that of humans 
therefore social line crossing between the two realms was not unheard of (Gen 18:1). This 
social line crossing was primarily the prerogative of ‘holy persons’ who could mediate gifts 
from God for ordinary people. This is why it is not surprising for Morden Jews to traverse back 
and forth between mundane and sacred spaces. They can alternate between praying and 
conversing with others seemingly seamlessly (Pilch 2004: 41). This is also conspicuous within 
cultures in which people are apt for alternate states of consciousness experiences whether 
this is intentionally or unintentional. (Pilch 2004: 41).   Where entrance into alternates states 
of consciousness is deliberate and therefore induced body requires a specific tuning or 
orientation in order to experience this state (Pilch 2004: 172). From the socio-scientific 
perspective, the question of whether indeed Jesus Christ was resurrected an answer can be 
given that yes, indeed but in alternate states of consciousness, in another realm of reality. 
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Chapter 5 
Summary and Conclusion 
As has been stated in the introduction, the subject of the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth is 
so vast that the literature available is just inexhaustible. Be that as it may, the following 
conclusions can be distilled from the present study: The traditional/confessional interpretive 
methods that a priori consider the resurrection narratives in the Gospels and in the first letter 
to the Corinthians to be historical facts in the life of Jesus of Nazareth, can no longer be 
tenable given what we know now from a critical analysis of the resurrection corpus. The 
historical-critical methods of reading the Bible have also been determined to be not only an 
exercise in speculation but also an exercise in futility. By and large, historical-critical 
interpretation brands the resurrection narratives to be hallucinations and a figment of the 
apostles’ imagination. While this is a possibility, we cannot go back in time to the first century 
to examine the psychological state of the visionaries. A historical-critical interpretation that 
is based on the western scientific world view ineluctably reaches a conclusion that Jesus of 
Nazareth was not raised from the dead and could not have been raised given the scientific 
world-view into which we are socialised about the natural laws and the ontology of the human 
body. Nevertheless, as exposure to other worldviews reveals, there is more to reality than 
what can be apprehended by the senses. 
 Consequently, we have established that socio-scientific historiography is the best option but 
as has been pointed out, there are two main orientations to the socio-scientific interpretive 
methods. The main strand is the one represented by Pieter Craffert which ends at 
acknowledging that post-resurrection sightings as real to the observers involved. However, 
the fact that this version of socio-scientific interpretation shies away from examining the 
actual contents of contemporary altered states of consciousness makes it inadequate 
especially where implications to contemporary South African Christian praxis is concerned. 
This is why the inclination of the present study is towards John Pilch’s socio-scientific 
methodology. Having established that all human beings are the same in terms of their 
biological and neurological make up, Pilch goes on to prescribe methods in which the 
researcher can psychologically position him/herself in order to experience altered states of 
consciousness. 
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 The criticism levelled against John Pilch by Peiter Craffert would seem unfair. It would seem 
as if at first Craffert is right to criticize Pilch for being too absolute about his conclusions. We 
may remember the words of Theissen and Merz in their foreword that “scholars do not say, 
‘That’s what it was’, but it could have been like that on the basis of the sources”. (Theissen 
and Merz 1998: Foreword).  Smith also, is of the view that few professionals would regard any 
event of the past, especially the distant past as ‘historically secure’ (Smith 2019: 57). 
Therefore, it should be enough to prove a case on a preponderance of probability. As has 
been shown from the foregoing, it is increasingly becoming apparent that there is more to 
reality than what meets the eye and contemporary studies on out of body experiences and 
near-death experiences give us a window into the contents of these phenomena.  
What has been the biggest problem with researchers such as Pieter Craffert is their exclusive 
reliance on secondary information or primary researches done by others. This is indeed 
surprising given that socio-scientific criticism claims to appropriate social-science 
methodology and one stock in trade method is participant observation of contemporary 
phenomena similar to those depicted in ancient Mediterranean.  Notwithstanding the 
richness of South Africa in terms of cultural phenomena resembling first-century scenarios, 
participant observation of those belief communities is conspicuous by its absence in South 
African New Testament scholarship. The African Traditional Religions and 
Pentecostal/Charismatic communities some of whom have claimed the ability to raise people 
from the dead, abound with phenomena that mimic biblical social systems. These should 
therefore be studied ethnographically so as to compare their practices with New Testament 
phenomenon.  Craffert is right when he points out that scholars of Judaism and Christianity 
are not the only ones encountering heavenly journeys in their texts.  Craffert goes on to assert 
that the phenomenon of ‘soul flights’ is such a widespread phenomenon in religious and 
cultural traditions that it can almost be seen as a human universal (Craffert 2015:386). 
Again, the area of philosophy of religion concerning the human makeup needs to be 
considered so that scholars disabuse themselves of the notion that a human being is 
exclusively a function of biology. Craffert does not differ with those who assert that the 
resurrected visions were hallucinations although he does not say this explicitly. Craffert hides 
behind the assertion that these are neurocultural phenomena or imaginal experiences 
without corresponding outside reality. The implication is not different from the ones who 
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have said that visions of the resurrected Christ were hallucinations. The only thing that he 
avoids is the implication that resurrection visions were pathological.  
The response that conservative scholars give for the absence of resurrection or after-life in 
the Bible is that biblical revelation is progressive. They point to the understanding of the 
concept of the Messiah and his kingdom as one example of the progression of the revelation 
from a mundane conception to the spiritual understanding of the kingdom of God. For 
instance concerning the evolution of the Messianic concept, Nortje-Meyer chairperson of the 
Department of Religion Studies at the University of Johannesburg contends that “on the basis 
of our investigation we think that what we find in the gospels is a new expression with new 
content of the Messiahship as it is brought into relation with Jesus and identified with him” 
(Nortje-Meyer 2005: 130). The implication is that New Testament scholars in South Africa 
should remain open to new ideas and methods that help us better understand resurrection 
narratives. Du Rand is of the opinion that the miracle narratives in the Bible should no longer 
be rationalised to fit positivistic natural explanations. The result is that miracle narratives are 
taken seriously, taking belief in an omnipresent, transcendent God, to emphasize that God is 
capable of doing anything, nature notwithstanding, including the debated resurrection of 
Jesus of Nazareth (Du Rand 2005: 148).  
The biblical interpreter has to see interpretive work as part of a much larger system of 
thought, in the sense of a philosophical basis. We should take notice of philosophical 
hermeneutics, but also have to evaluate systems guiding world views. This means that 
postmodern interpreters will need to be more broadly prepared in linguistics and philosophy. 
In postmodern interpretation, we also have to discuss hermeneutical theory global and 
multicultural issues at stake. We are faced in the postmodern period with large issues, posed 
by greater contact with a divergence of cultures in our world. Our increased contact with such 
a variety in God’s world has shown that there are actually different perceptions of reality. 
Different people will look at truth from varying perspectives. A fully postmodern 
interpretation will need to be fully global and fully multicultural (Du Rand 2005: 148-228).  
We can no longer ignore the fact of our multireligious context in South Africa (Coetzee 2005: 
100). Therefore, the historical method should include a public and conscious investigation of 
the historian’s own ultimate presuppositions as well as those of the subjects.  Furthermore, 
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from a critical realist perspective, it is accepted that there also exists a reality totally 
independent from any human representations: “Indeed, the potential to shift, voluntarily or 
involuntarily between different states of consciousness is a function of the universal human 
nervous system” (Pilch 2004: 30). 
  What is sad about the South African religious environment is that many Pentecostal church 
leaders have been accused of stealing from the poor through a number of gimmicks. They 
have claimed that they alone can broker blessings from God to the hapless mortals. While the 
concept of ‘holy man’ has its basis in the Bible, what these ‘holy men’ are not putting 
concomitant emphasis on is the fact that every human body is ‘hard wired’ for alternate states 
of consciousness. No one has a monopoly over an audience with divinity. It is possible to 
intentionally induce trance experience. Common strategies include listening to music, fasting 
and prayer among other techniques. We have seen our fair share of the bizarre in South 
African Pentecostal Christianity. The mistake, however, that our commentators and analysts 
make is to judge those phenomena against norms of rationality. Pilch argues that though 
these phenomena are not ‘irrational’, they are nevertheless ‘nonrational’, meaning that 
rationality is not the metric against which to judge these experiences (Pilch 2004: 19). 
Further research social-scientific research needs to be done in the area of the strange and 
bizarre. More participant observation needs to be within contemporary communities whose 
practices mirror the scenarios of the New Testament. That way, we are able to reconstruct 
the social milieu that obtained in the New Testament. 
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